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Recent research reveals a precipitous decrease in Catholic adherents across Latin 
America. Since 1970, numerous Latin Americans have professed a shift to Protestantism. 
Scholars have analyzed this trend within certain countries and as a regional tendency, but 
have not comprehensively addressed the Colombian case. 
Colombia is often considered the most Catholic of Latin American countries, with 
the Church historically much enmeshed in national politics. This thesis evaluates shifts in 
identified Colombian Catholics, the emergence of Protestantism, and other religious 
phenomena during three key historical epochs since 1930. Given Catholicism’s historical 
bond with politics and society, these trends are meaningful for the future of Colombian 
politics. 
While this thesis reaches some conclusions regarding future Colombian religious-
political dynamics, its major contribution is its synthesis of the history and literature 
covering the chief religious-political themes in Colombian history since 1930 and 
revealing patterns of religious-political interaction, where such an endeavor has not been 
accomplished elsewhere. Aiming to integrate sufficiently detailed historical accounts and 
statistics with diverse published academic analyses, this thesis lays the groundwork for 
more detailed prognostic studies on the future of the Colombian political system as it 
relates to a changing, yet in some respects incongruously stationary religious 
environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent research headlined by a comprehensive 2014 Pew Research Center study 
reveals a precipitous decrease in Catholic adherents across Latin America.1 Prior to 1970, 
most Latin American countries were greater than 90% Catholic. Figure 1 reveals a trend 
of Latin Americans professing shifts to Protestantism or away from religion entirely since 
1970.  
Figure 1.  Share of Catholics Decreasing in Latin America; Protestants and 
Religiously Unaffiliated Increasing (% of Total Population Belonging to 
Each Religious Group) 
 
Source: “Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic 
Region,” Pew Research Center, November 13, 2014, 26, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/
11/13/religion-in-latin-america/. 
Scholars have analyzed these trends within certain countries, especially Brazil, 
and as a broader regional tendency, but current scholarship has not comprehensively 
addressed the Colombian case.  
                                                 
1 “Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region” (Pew Research 
Center, November 13, 2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/. 
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Colombia is often considered the most Catholic of Latin American countries.2 
This is for various reasons, but to generalize, the Catholic Church in Colombia 
historically has so deeply invaded (and been invaded by) government and politics that its 
resultant social position has been little short of supreme. Nevertheless, that dominance 
has gone in waves throughout Colombia’s history, all while Catholic adherence as a 
social construct has remained paramount. Colombian Catholicism joined the broader 
regional down trend post-1970, opening the door to a political–religious environment that 
has not been seen before in that country. Colombian Catholicism’s decline, however, has 
been slower and less pronounced than in most of its neighbors. Table 1 reveals 
Colombia’s 2014 Catholic adherent percentage as 10% above the Latin American 
average presented previously in Figure 1 (observe the table footnote for an explanation of 
the low 1910 statistic). 
Table 1.   Catholic Affiliation in Colombia (% of Population)3 
 
Adapted from: “Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically 
Catholic Region,” Pew Research Center, November 13, 2014, 27, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/. 
                                                 
2 James E. Goff, “The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia, 1948–1958, With an 
Investigation of Its Background and Causes” (master’s thesis, San Francisco Theological Seminary, 1965), 
1/1; Justo L. González and Ondina E. González, Christianity in Latin America: A History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 171; Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and Modernization in 
Latin America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 34; Elizabeth E. Brusco, The Reformation of 
Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia (University of Texas Press, 2011), 23. 
3 The Pew study states that 80% of Colombians were Catholic in 1910, a statistic that allegedly 
increased to 91% by 1950. Initially, this thesis intended to analyze this early 20th century increase as an 
anomaly to the rest of Latin America, for which the 1910 numbers roughly mirror the 1950 ones. It appears, 
however, that this statistic is a mistake. A footnote from Benjamin Haddox’s 1961 dissertation is revealing. 
He does his own math, excluding the populations of two departments whose census did not record religious 
affiliation (11.5% of total population). Benjamin E. Haddox, “A Sociological Study of the Institution of 
Religion in Colombia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1962), 37. Were this unspecified portion of the 
population included as Catholics, the 1910 number would fall within 0.5% of the 1950 result in the Pew 
study. The 1951 Colombian census did not ask for religious affiliation, meaning the Pew researchers must 
have pulled that year’s data from other sources (Haddox, “A Sociological Study of the Institution of 
Religion in Columbia,” 37). While this explanation for the relatively low 1910 Catholic adherent level is 
not watertight, it is sufficient for this thesis to justify focusing in more depth on recent periods. 
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This thesis evaluates and compares changes in identified Colombian Catholics 
during three key historical epochs since 1930. This evaluation includes some analysis of 
other notable religious phenomena, especially the rise of Protestantism and secularism. 
There are two major questions to answer: What has driven these shifts, and how will 
these religious changes affect religion’s relationship with Colombian politics in the 
future? 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTIONS 
Catholic influence is ubiquitous in Latin American political history. This is 
especially true in Colombia, which as recently as 1991 removed constitutional mandates 
of Catholicism as the state religion. Political patterns and historical institutions of 
ecclesiastical influence4 remain relatively fresh. Nevertheless, in spite of the Catholic 
Church’s official persistence and moves toward engaging burgeoning civil society as it 
arose during the most recent half-century, it has also seen a steady exodus of adherents—
a trend scholarship has only recently emphasized (note the previously cited Pew study). 
If past Catholic institutions are politically and thus socially intertwined, these 
trends should mean something for the future of Colombian politics. It will prove useful to 
discover how past religious dynamics affected the Colombian political environment in 
order to anticipate how modern shifts in religious dynamics may affect future political 
outcomes, including the resolution (or not) of the socio-political conflicts that have 
plagued the country for decades. 
B. TYPOGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS 
Certain terms are used often and should be clarified: Catholic and Church (capital 
“C”) refer to the Roman Catholic Church. Protestant represents Christians who are not 
Catholic. The term Evangelical is not used except where directly quoted, since not all 
Protestants consider themselves Evangelical. The purpose of this thesis is not to delineate 
the differences among Christian denominations. Although terminological nuances and 
doctrinal distinctions exist, this thesis uses a single term for simplicity and clarity; it 
                                                 
4 The word influence, as this thesis uses it, means an ability to affect the sentiments or actions of a 
person, group, or entity. 
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therefore refers to all non-Catholic Christians as Protestant. For consistency, the word 
church (lowercase “c”) refers to non-Catholic church entities. 
C. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature on the Catholic Church in Colombia is existent but sporadic. Much 
of the research available is spotted within works that form a broader body on Latin 
America as a whole. Few authors have focused specifically on Colombia, and among 
them, many have published untranslated Spanish editions that present challenges both for 
acquisition and translation. This thesis references Spanish-language literature when 
feasible, since it often represents the perspectives of those closest to the issues, while 
recognizing that an English speaker’s distance from the issues may improve objectivity. 
That presumption notwithstanding, non-Colombians have their own biases as well. 
Objectivity of the literature is an unavoidable challenge. Russell Ramsey, for 
example, observed in 1973 that academic discourse on the political, religious, and social 
conflict that was La Violencia (a period of intense political and social violence that 
ravaged Colombia from the late 1940s through the 1950s) constitutes an “emotional and 
politically supercharged atmosphere.” He claimed that the then-existent literature was, as 
a rule, biased (domestic authors) or misguided (international authors).5 In general, it 
seems that the more recent the scholarship, the more objective the perspective. Much of 
the scholarship on Catholic history in Colombia is, however, dated, and is in some cases 
used for its factual evidence more than its argumentative leanings or conclusions. The 
conclusions herein favor the preponderance of evidence, observing general trends and 
using examples to elaborate. Naturally, there are exceptions to every generalization, 
which this thesis aims to represent where possible. 
The literature can be sliced in a number of ways: Those that study Catholicism 
within the broader Latin American context and those that focus specifically on Colombia, 
or those interested in specific themes like gender roles or social organization versus those 
who treat the Colombian religious situation broadly. Within those categories, some 
                                                 
5 Russell W. Ramsey, “Critical Bibliography on La Violencia in Colombia,” Latin American Research 
Review 8, no. 1 (April 1, 1973): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2502694. 
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analyze the last century in its entirety while others focus on specific eras of history. The 
literature that covers history more broadly tends to repeat itself from author to author, 
providing mutual corroboration but limited depth. This study finds the fidelity necessary 
for valuable conclusions through a synergy of the broad with the specific. 
1. Historical Framework 
In covering three historical epochs (1930–1960: La Violencia era, 1960–1990: 
Frente Nacional6 and Vatican II, and 1990–present: new Colombian constitution and no 
official state religion), the content that follows aims to balance between making analysis 
unmanageably broad and ignoring history altogether. A certain amount of pre-1930 
Catholic political history in Colombia is helpful for framing the body of analysis to come.  
Patricia Londoño-Vega offers a detailed view of the Colombian Church’s 
influence and power structure in politics and society between 1850–1930, providing an 
historical backdrop for the time periods treated in detail here.7 Cornelia Butler Flora adds 
depth to this backdrop with her demographic history of Colombia that recognizes 
geography as a significant player in post-colonial ethnic segregation, which we will find 
is one notable dynamic for this study.8 
Among modern scholars who have written comprehensive works on Catholicism 
in Latin America, John Frederick Schwaller is at the fore. He covers in systematic-
historical order the history of Latin American Catholicism “from conquest to revolution 
and beyond.”9 His book’s usefulness for this study is limited, however, as only one small 
section speaks specifically to Colombia, focusing on La Violencia. A more dated, but 
prolific scholar on Latin American Catholicism is Daniel H. Levine. A political scientist, 
                                                 
6 The Frente Nacional was a political power-sharing regime ostensibly aimed at decreasing partisan 
violence. 
7 Patricia Londoño-Vega, Religion, Culture, and Society in Colombia: Medellín and Antioquia, 1850–
1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). 
8 Cornelia Butler Flora, Pentecostalism in Colombia: Baptism by Fire and Spirit (Rutherford, NJ: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976), 68–69. 
9 John Frederick Schwaller, The History of the Catholic Church in Latin America: From Conquest to 
Revolution and Beyond (New York: New York University Press, 2011), quotation is the book’s subtitle. 
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Levine has written some Colombia-specific literature.10 He analyzes the relationships 
between politics and religion, but also evaluates social dynamics, a puzzle piece that any 
discussion of politics and religion is incomplete without. Even his work on broader Latin 
America offers parcels of wisdom on these dynamics in Colombia.11 Levine’s 
scholarship provides a solid foundation on which to build more detailed analysis 
throughout the periods in question.  
Levine’s more recent work, along with Satya Pattnayak, and Bushnell and 
Hudson bring historical background into focus on contemporary dynamics. Their 
arguments focus around the impacts of increased popular organization and community-
based strength over hierarchical norms.12  
2. Unreliable Measures of Religiosity 
In 1962, Benjamin Haddox produced a then-comprehensive dissertation on the 
sociology of religion through Colombia’s history. He emphasizes the power of Catholic 
traditionalism, especially in rural environments, with respect to issues like violence and 
social continuity.13 Local heritage, rather than issues, historically drove political party 
                                                 
10 Daniel H. Levine, “Colombia: The Institutional Church and the Popular,” in Religion and Political 
Conflict in Latin America, ed. Daniel H. Levine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 
187–217; Daniel H. Levine, Religion and Politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and 
Colombia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
11 Daniel H. Levine, ed., Churches and Politics in Latin America (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 
Inc, 1980); Daniel H. Levine, ed., Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1986); Daniel H. Levine, Popular Voices in Latin American Catholicism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Daniel H. Levine, Politics, Religion and Society in Latin 
America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012); Daniel H. Levine, “Religion and Politics, Politics 
and Religion: An Introduction,” in Churches and Politics in Latin America, ed. Daniel H. Levine (Beverly 
Hills: SAGE Publications, Inc, 1980), 16–40. 
12 Daniel H. Levine, “The Future of Christianity in Latin America: Working Paper #340” (Kellogg 
Institute, August 2007), 28, http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/religion.shtml; Satya R. 
Pattnayak, “Social Change, Political Competition, and Religious Innovation in Latin America: An 
Introduction,” in Organized Religion in the Political Transformation of Latin America, ed. Satya R. 
Pattnayak (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 7; David Bushnell and Rex A. Hudson, “The 
Society and Its Environment,” in Colombia: A Country Study, ed. Rex A. Hudson, 5th ed., Area Handbook 
Series (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010), 125. 
13 Haddox, “Sociological Study,” Chapter VI of Haddox’s dissertation centers on these and similar 
issues. 
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alignment in Colombia, adds Robert H. Dix.14 Nevertheless, Haddox specifically does 
allow for catalysts of change, a point that Flora advances in her 1984 work on 
Pentecostalism, a prominent Protestant denomination. She observes various signals of 
decreased religiosity among Colombian Catholics during the second epoch studied in this 
thesis.15 Marco Palacios elaborates on the various aspects of the Catholic institution that 
counterintuitively fed such decreased religiosity and worked against the Church’s unity 
and supremacy in Colombia.16  
3. La Violencia 
Numerous authors approach the question of the Church-State relationship during 
La Violencia. Carlos A. Leon touches on the psychological aspects of religion’s use in 
justifying political violence, and elaborates on how such a “coexistence of religious 
norms with attitudes of rejection and antagonism to these norms” was possible in 
Colombia.17 Dix contends that this coexistence and its resultant moral inefficacy caused 
the Church to miss an opportunity to strengthen itself by unifying the nation.18  
Focusing specifically on Protestant persecution during La Violencia, James E. 
Goff argues for Conservative Catholic political affiliation as the primary cause for 
Protestant persecution.19 He also claims that high statistical Catholicism in Colombia is a 
façade preserved by Catholic social power.20 Rodolfo Ramón de Roux is not so certain, 
showcasing Catholic arguments against alleged Protestant ties to subversion. Roux’s 
                                                 
14 Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change, 1st edition (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1967), 222. 
15 Cornelia Butler Flora, “Religiosity among Working Class Catholic Colombians,” in The Catholic 
Church and Religions in Latin America, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau, Chester E. Gabriel, and Mary Mooney 
(Montreal: McGill University Centre for Developing-Area Studies, 1984), 67–87. 
16 Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002, trans. 
Richard Stoller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2006). 
17 Carlos A. Leon, “Unusual Patterns of Crime During La Violencia in Colombia,” American Journal 
of Psychiatry 125, no. 11 (May 1, 1969): 1573, doi:10.1176/ajp.125.11.1564. 
18 Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change, 310–11. 
19 Goff, “The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia, 1948–1958, With an Investigation of 
Its Background and Causes,” 2/1. 
20 Ibid., 2/17–19, 2/28, 2/55, 11/3–4. 
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evidence is mostly anecdotal, however, and centered on Catholic sources.21 Vernon Lee 
Fluharty examines vertical disparities in both the Colombian Church and in the country’s 
politics—he argues that what happened at the bottom was not necessarily the will of the 
top, and vice-versa.22 Finally, Palacios examines the urban-rural dimension, noting that 
as violence drove urban migration, radical guerrilla groups in the countryside gained 
strength and conflict shifted away from traditional political poles.23 These dynamics were 
the beginning of contemporary socio-political conflicts in Colombia.  
4. Protestant Growth and Post-La Violencia Dynamics  
Respecting increased Protestantism in Colombia, Elizabeth Brusco and David 
Stoll argue that Catholic political monopoly may have galvanized Protestant growth by 
forcing it to operate at a grassroots, movement level.24 Virginia Garrard-Burnett agrees, 
specifically claiming the positive impacts of decreased machismo in such grassroots 
environments.25 William K. Kay and Cornelia Butler Flora both contribute thorough 
analyses of Pentecostalism, a dominant Protestant denomination.26 While Kay’s work 
offers limited Colombia-specific insight, Flora’s does, focusing on geographic, class, and 
gender-based power dynamics, emphasizing social dislocation as the key driver of 
religious shifts. A contrasting perspective comes from Anthony Gill, who presents a 
                                                 
21 Rodolfo Ramón de Roux, Una Iglesia en Estado de Alerta: Funciones Sociales y Funcionamiento 
del Catolicismo Colombiano, 1930–1980 (Bogotá: Servicio Colombiano de Comunicación Social, 1983). 
22 Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 
1930–1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957). 
23 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 161. 
24 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 143; David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?: The 
Politics of Evangelical Growth, First Edition edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 318. 
25 Elizabeth Brusco, “The Reformation of Machismo: Asceticism and Masculinity among Colombian 
Evangelicals,” in Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America, ed. Virginia Garrard-Burnett and David Stoll 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 143–58. Cited in Virginia Garrard-Burnett, “Conclusion: Is 
This Latin America’s Reformation?,” in Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America, ed. Virginia Garrard-
Burnett and David Stoll (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 205. 
26 William K. Kay, Pentecostalism (London: SCM Press, 2009); Flora, Pentecostalism in Colombia. 
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supply and demand theory—that decreased government influence on religion increases its 
diversity, supply, and consumption.27 
5. The Frente Nacional and Popular Engagement 
As the post-La Violencia political and social environment re-stabilized under the 
Frente Nacional, the Church faced an adaptation crisis. Robert H. Dix examines the 
political nature of how the Colombian Church hierarchy responded to the new Catholic 
environment under Vatican II and the new Colombian environment in general, which was 
urbanizing, modernizing, and demanding greater social inclusion.28 That adaptation 
proved challenging: Flora observes that generally, Colombian Catholic leadership 
discouraged movements toward lay leadership and the social engagement common in 
neighboring countries.29 Thomas C. Bruneau and W. E. Hewitt build upon this point, 
exploring the ways that the Latin American sociocultural environment has limited the 
Catholic Church’s options for innovation in the face of changing social structures and 
pressures.30 David E. Mutchler, Roux, and Levine all offer arguments for Catholicism’s 
incipient decline in the decades following La Violencia, rooted in the disconnect between 
the new Colombian social reality and the strength of Catholic institutionalism in the 
Colombian Church.31  
6. The Constituent Assembly and Thereafter 
By the 1990 constituent assembly, concludes Gene Burns, the Church had not 
given up on its political role, but had resigned itself to a subordinate, nonpartisan 
                                                 
27 Anthony Gill, “Government Regulation, Social Anomie and Protestant Growth in Latin America a 
Cross-National Analysis,” Rationality and Society 11, no. 3 (August 1, 1999): 287–316, doi:10.1177/
104346399011003002. 
28 Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. 
29 Flora, “Religiosity among Working Class Catholic Colombians,” 83. 
30 Thomas C. Bruneau and W. E. Hewitt, “Catholicism and Political Action in Brazil: Limitations and 
Prospects,” in Conflict and Competition: The Latin American Church in a Changing Environment, ed. 
Edward L Cleary and Hannah W Stewart-Gambino (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 45. 
31 David E Mutchler, The Church as a Political Factor in Latin America: With Particular Reference to 
Colombia and Chile (New York: Praeger, 1971); Roux, Estado de Alerta; Levine, “Institutional Church.” 
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appearance even while continuing to pursue influence behind the scenes.32 Ten years 
after the 1991 constitution and the new religious freedom it provided, Paul Freston 
observed that Protestant political participation remained active but of minor impact; he 
postulated continued preeminence for the two traditional Colombian parties.33 But Peter 
L. Berger deepens Freston’s analysis, distinguishing between the democratic outcomes of 
collective religious mobilization and individual conviction.34 The combined actions of 
individuals may prove of greater weight on the system than do institutionalized religious 
endeavors. That question notwithstanding, we must ask what impelled this drive for 
constitutional religious freedom. 
Although secularization theory itself is beyond this thesis’ scope, the discussion 
surrounding it is of use since we are examining significant statistical religious shifts. 
Authors examining secularization include Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, who relate 
levels of religious adherence with poverty, and Ekrem Karakoç and Birol Başkan, who 
make a contrasting connection between religion and inequality.35 Anthony Gill and Erik 
Lundsgaarde claim that welfare programs are the prime correlate.36 
Frances Hagopian proposes a new framework to explain the decisions of religious 
power-holders that can be applied in Colombia’s modern pluralistic religious 
environment. She argues that civil societies hold the key to such policies; where the 
Church is strongly linked to civil society, it tends to engage on that level, whereas when 
civil society linkages are weak, the Church seeks a voice within and protection through 
                                                 
32 Gene Burns, The Frontiers of Catholicism: The Politics of Ideology in a Liberal World (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1992), 165. 
33 Paul Freston, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America (West Nyack, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 227–8, 235–6, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/
docDetail.action?docID=10130412. 
34 Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999). 
35 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ekrem Karakoç and Birol Başkan, “Religion in Politics: How 
Does Inequality Affect Public Secularization?,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 12 (December 1, 
2012): 1510–41, doi:10.1177/0010414012453027. 
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1043463104046694. 
 11
political alliances.37 While it does not specifically analyze Colombia, Hagopian’s 
argument is a logical place to conclude this review of the literature. It summarizes 
cursorily the Catholic Church’s roles, actions, and confusion during the time periods  
evaluated here. What it does not do is apply nicely to Protestant political roles in the new 
pluralistic environment. For that, this thesis offers some hypotheses. 
D. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Some argue that a decline in Catholic adherents in Latin America is little more 
than a reality-check, as those who professed the faith out of compulsion or socio-political 
pressure in the past are finding new freedoms to simply be honest. Common sense 
certainly testifies to the compelling nature of such a claim. Nevertheless, in Colombia the 
faith was something other than what it was in the rest of Latin America. It was ingrained 
so deeply in the national psyche that its tenets could be used to endorse all manner of 
political ends, from conquest to cleansing, benevolence to torture—after all of which the 
Church remained official and ostensibly embraced by a statistically unanimous 
population.38  
This hypothesis continues to argue that the beginnings of statistical Catholic 
decline coincided with decreased Catholic control in social and political spheres and 
diminished threats to life and property associated with dissent. The argument claims that 
Church dominance was a matter of its elite status, driven by elites rather than actual faith 
among (at least a portion of) its adherents. The delay in the statistical Catholic exodus in 
Colombia until some years after the harshest persecution of non-Catholics supports this 
argument. 
An alternative explanation for the current decline is that time and experience 
revealed a dark side of Catholicism that when exposed, began to drive adherents away 
and toward alternatives: many to Protestantism, others to renounce religion entirely. 
                                                 
37 Frances Hagopian, “Latin American Catholicism in an Age of Religious and Political Pluralism: A 
Framework for Analysis” (working paper #332, Kellogg Institute, December 2006), 2. 
38 Regarding Catholicism’s pervasive role in Colombian life: Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and 
Modernization, 34; Roux, Estado de Alerta, 74; Goff, “The Persecution of Protestant Christians in 
Colombia, 1948–1958, With an Investigation of Its Background and Causes,” 2/11; Data regarding 
Catholic adherents: “Religion in Latin America,” 27. 
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Some of the Pew study results that reveal the most common reasons former Catholics cite 
for leaving the Church support this argument. Those reasons mostly have to do with 
things that their experience in Catholicism lacked: such as “personal connection with 
God,” “morality,” “worship style,” “outreach,” and benevolence for members.39 
A third argument is that external influences drove this shift. This hypothesis in 
part refers to the role of foreign missionaries of non-Catholic faiths (principally 
Protestant Christians) arriving in Colombia and converting Catholics. It also refers, 
however, to the role of state actors (principally the United States) in promulgating their 
own initiatives using aid or research funds as carrots for participation. Finally, the 
Catholic hierarchy itself comprises an external influence structure.40 All three of the 
above hypotheses are likely correct to some degree, but regardless of the reason for the 
shift, the second (and more important) goal of this thesis is to compare the effects of 
religion on politics under differing circumstances across time with an aim toward 
anticipating future political–religious interplay.  
As Protestantism increases (alongside agnostics and other unaffiliateds) and the 
historically dominant role of the institutional Catholic Church declines, two potential 
outcomes are apparent. First, that as the historically pacific and heterogeneous Protestant 
movement encourages greater political freedom, those who believe in the God of the 
Bible no longer feel the need to side with a specific church or party affiliation. This 
argument also claims an increase in peaceful political discourse since in its ideal case, 
political affiliation is (at least theoretically) no longer tied to elite power structures, 
religious or political.  
The second alternative is simply that Catholic believers have remained basically 
unchanged in demographic proportion, and that the only reason for the changes in 
adherents observed in the Pew study is earlier social and political pressure that drove 
many to identify with Catholicism while in fact their hearts were not truly engaged. The 
outcome of this argument is that the Colombian Catholic Church remains essentially 
                                                 
39 “Religion in Latin America,” 5. 
40 Regarding U.S. and Catholic hierarchy influence (detailed in Chapter IV): Mutchler, The Church as 
a Political Factor in Latin America. 
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where it was a little over one century ago. Were this true, we might expect a mixed bag of 
religious political plays by the Catholic Church in the decades to come, most of which 
would be reactive, judging from history—the difference being Protestant and non-
affiliated minorities that are increasingly involved in the process.  
E. DESIGN OF THE ANALYSIS 
The chapters that follow divide the late 20th century (1930–present) in Colombia 
into three principal epochs respecting the Catholic Church and politics. Their divisions 
are not black and white; some overlap between periods is inevitable. 1930–1960 
constitutes the La Violencia era; 1960–1990, when the National Front political regime 
tempered political unrest while re-establishing elite political dominance and Vatican II 
transformed the methods of Catholicism; and 1990–present, which represents Colombia 
under its new constitution and without Catholicism as the state religion. 
This thesis evaluates each epoch respecting Church influence in politics and vice-
versa. As previously noted, such analysis demands a corresponding examination of the 
social sphere, as religion and politics could not exist without it. The analysis considers 
the methods and modes of political and religious change evident from Catholicism’s hand 
in the varying social and political environments represented by the three epochs. 
Protestantism as a competing religious system is examined as applicable. 
Finally, the conclusions from these comparisons offer insights into how the 
Catholic Church and the transforming religious environment in Colombia will bear on 
politics in the future. 
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II. A CONCISE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. COLOMBIA’S DEMOCRACY AND THE CHURCH  
Any attempt to dissect a modern topic requires an understanding of history and its 
connections with the present issue. A cursory review of pre-1930 Catholic political 
history in Colombia proves beneficial for this thesis’ analysis. 
Colombia boasts the longest-running democracy in Latin America, but as Ana 
María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro observe, it “has always been a democracy with 
adjectives.”41 Identifying the crucial distinction between “democratization of culture and 
ordinary life [and democracy] at the level of institutions,” Levine explains that in 
Colombia, “‘democracy’ has meant civilian rule, party competition, and limited 
mobilization. Prevailing norms have not furthered the extension of democratic ideals to 
social relations or associational life generally. To the contrary, hierarchy has been the 
order of the day in Colombia, with little legitimate place provided either for popular 
mobilization or for the construction of democratic patterns of governance within 
organizations”42 The Church historically played heavily in that hierarchical order.  
According to Ivan Vallier, the Colombian Church is often deemed the most 
“authentic” and “traditional” in Latin America, and historically was extensively involved 
in non-clerical decision making and action.43 It is recognized among Latin American 
Churches as historically one of the most intertwined with public institutions. This 
privileged position traditionally gave the Church considerable leverage and support for its 
politics.44 Indeed, from colonization through the La Violencia period, the Church was 
politically privileged and institutionally fortified by law and custom.45 As the official 
                                                 
41 Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro, “From ‘Restricted’ to ‘Besieged’: The Changing Nature 
of the Limits to Democracy in Colombia,” in The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: 
Advances and Setbacks, ed. Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 235. 
42 Levine, Popular Voices, 91. 
43 Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and Modernization, 123. 
44 Ibid., 34. 
45 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 23. 
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religion of most Latin American countries, Colombia included, Catholicism was 
preeminent throughout life and statehood. From colonization through the mid-twentieth 
century, the Church faced little viable competition and relied on its elite position rather 
than market forces to subsist. Levine calls it a “lazy monopolist.”46 The Colombian 
Church and State were as one: a “model of the traditional ideal of Christendom”—it 
administrated society through birth, education, marriage, and death.47 Levine observes 
that Colombian Church leadership historically took for given their authority’s tentacled 
relationships with various aspects of Colombian life; indeed such relationships were 
central to Church unity and legitimacy.48 This institutional and hierarchical nature meant 
that even if the Church sought to extract itself from politics, it would not be able entirely 
to do so. Social, economic, and political issues such as land rights, for example, gave rise 
to conflict between various levels of society and government, all of which the Church 
was integrated in. Priestly actions were unavoidably political.49 
In contrast to some other Latin American countries, where the capital is the center 
of culture and administration, Colombia’s geographically separated administrative 
departments also represented variant cultural divisions. This design fit well with the 
Church’s historical organization, which emphasized territory-based power and influence 
through localized, paternalistic relations with the laity.50 The Church operated with little 
accountability. In some far-flung regions, a priest was not only a religious figure, but also 
the center of socio-political authority and the community’s gateway to the rest of the 
world.51 Such absolute authority led one mid-nineteenth century missionary in New 
Granada (now Colombia) to observe, “the church fostered ‘mere ceremonies irrespective 
                                                 
46 Levine, Politics, Religion, and Society, 21. 
47 Levine, Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia, 70. 
48 Levine, “Institutional Church,” 193. 
49 Levine, Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia, 195. 
50 Everett Einar Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, 
IL: Dorsey Press, 1962), 353–84; Thomas Lynn Smith, Colombia: Social Structure and the Process of 
Development (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967); both consulted in Vallier, Catholicism, 
Social Control and Modernization, 123. 
51 Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and Modernization, 33. 
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of any exercises of the heart.’”52 Vallier posits that such politicization of religion is 
socially destructive:  
If a religious system, as represented by its spokesmen and elites, becomes 
identified with a particular political group and finds that its survival is 
bound up with the survival of that group, it loses an autonomous position 
of leverage to build and create a generalized system of meanings. Instead 
of functioning as a carrier and refurbisher of common values and social 
consensus, it becomes an ideology for a special interest group or a 
political power structure. Instead of the religion providing a higher order 
of meanings and value standards, it drops into an identifiable position in 
the stratification system. Its activities and pronouncements are viewed by 
the nonprivileged groups as part of the dominant power system. If this 
happens, the distinction between the political and religious spheres 
collapses. Competition and social conflict emerge as naked struggles of 
force and power, rather than as processes of give and take that can be 
muted and sustained by a set of common beliefs of a more general 
nature.53 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, historians began decreasing their 
emphasis on the Church’s influence on politics, focusing more on class conflict and 
capitalism.54 That shift reflected some emergent realities: The prosperity of 
predominantly Protestant countries in part motivated liberal elites to push for concepts 
like individualism, global integration, and popular education in an effort to chase the 
successes of Protestant countries in Europe and North America.55 Nevertheless, 
Colombian parties are historically vertical rather than horizontal and, outside elite circles, 
this changing socio-political tide struggled to reach most Colombians. Political identity in 
Colombia was akin to a genetic trait: “people are ‘born liberal or conservative,’” and 
parties are more a part of culture than prescriptions for government policy.56 
                                                 
52 Isaac F. Holton, New Granada: Twenty Months in the Andes (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1857); 
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53 Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and Modernization, 44–45. 
54 Charles Bergquist, “Introduction: Colombian Violence in Historical Perspective,” in Violence in 
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B. THE CHURCH’S POLITICAL NATURE 
Prior to 1958, modern Colombian politics (post-1861) comprised a two party 
system dominated by one party or the other for long periods at a time. From the end of 
the 19th century through 1930, Conservatives monopolized control of government.57 The 
Church associated itself with Conservative politics because, argues Levine, “the 
institutional Church in Colombia sees a threat in the popular because its leaders see the 
stress on class, solidarity, and shared authority as a challenge to the structure of power 
within the ecclesiastical institution and, hence, to the very survival of the church as they 
know it.”58 To wit, the Encyclopedia of Christianity identifies Colombia’s Church as 
“most conservative ... in Latin America.”59 
Catholic animosity toward political Liberals was fervent and widespread. The 
1886 Colombian Constitution, which originated the present-day Republic, fueled the 
Church’s political fervor, citing Catholicism as “the religion of the nation.”60 After the 
onset of the Republic, the Colombian state recognized the Catholic Church as “watchdog 
of the social order and the ideological overseer,”61 and the Church enjoyed full authority 
as the state religion as a result.62 As early as 1863 and through the 1940s, the Church 
resolutely “advised that ‘Liberalism was sin.’”63 In 1913, it correlated liberalism with 
“seductions of the unpious,” and in a 1930 letter, the Church called liberalism a threat, 
encouraging campesinos—poor, agrarian, rural-dwelling Colombians—not to urbanize, 
but to remain in their priest-monitored and controlled rural lives.64 Haddox argues that 
                                                 
57 Rex A. Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 5th ed., Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: 
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60 Levine, Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia, 65. 
61 Bromiley et al., “Colombia,” 606. 
62 González and González, Christianity in Latin America, 170. 
63 Malcom Deas, “Algunas Notas Sobre El Caciquismo En Colombia,” Revista de Occidente, 1973, 
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since Colombia’s founding, Catholic leaders have maintained campesinos in a 
subservient position, and campesinos in return have accepted that position as the will of 
God and diligently complied with the powers that be.65 Even for individuals who are 
progressive in other areas, a rejection of the Catholic faith “would indicate a rejection of 
the national culture.”66 Colombian politics have historically operated hierarchically, in 
parallel with the Church.  
Robert H. Dix observed in 1967, “the parties have served largely as instruments 
of control from above rather than as the means of effective political expression for a 
broad strata of the population. They have been inhibitors rather than promoters of 
democracy.”67 He acknowledges that Colombian parties are vertically integrated, but 
identification is tied to heritage rather than interest representation. This system 
“prevented the emergence of a class- or policy-based politics in Colombia.”68  
Dix supports the idea that pre-urbanization and secularization, the Church was 
able to engage and maintain ideological control at various political levels while 
maintaining its institutional power. One aspect of that power, argues Dix, was that 
historically aristocratic families would contribute a son to the priesthood. Those family 
ties helped to drive the elite interests of the Church.69 Another aspect of that power is the 
Church’s ritual authority that transcends class and party, requiring adherents to submit to 
its monopoly on moral judgment as “the earthly representative of a Deity who in the eyes 
of the campesino controls life, health, and the bountifulness of his fields.” Such a 
perspective “reinforces attitudes of fatalism and passivity which are at the same time a 
quite natural reflection of the campesinos’ position in society.”70  
But Catholic supremacy did face some systemic challenges in Colombia, observes 
Marco Palacios: Catholic organization reflected the distinction between national and local 
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politics, diocesan priests deferred to the bishop while congregational priests honored their 
orders first,71 the Catholic monopoly on education angered liberals who argued that the 
Church used its educational favor to indoctrinate rather than educate,72 and the Church’s 
institutionalization of education structures exacerbated the divide between rich and 
poor.73 Education was a primary tenet of Church influence in Colombia, and doctrinal 
differences between the various orders responsible for school administration, as well as 
conflict with governmental actors over the limits to the Church’s educational role further 
undermined that power.74 Such was the environment as the country approached the La 
Violencia era. 
Levine observes that although Catholicism’s privilege allowed it to dictate social 
design historically, changes in “traditions and organizational commitments” would 
enfranchise “new models of social and political action.”75 In 1930, traditional socio-
political arrangements began to show signs of stress. 
C. 1930: LIBERALS TAKE POWER 
In the preamble to the 1930 Colombian elections, the global economic depression 
exacerbated national issues and increasingly divided Conservatives, the Church included. 
Two Conservative candidates divided party votes and the Liberal contender won for the 
first time in nearly fifty years.76 Liberals initially attempted to form a coalition 
government, but some hard-liners with vendettas incited violence against Conservatives. 
Providentially, the violence faded quickly in light of a common border conflict with Peru 
that united the Colombians.77 Although some cite more-distant antecedents, like the 
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seldom-referenced political violence during the 1922 elections,78 the 1930 violence that 
followed such a dramatic shift in political power was a mirror-like precursor to what 
would happen sixteen years later. Ultimately, the 1930 ouster of the long-dominant 
Conservative party led to decreased Church influence in public life as Liberal leaders 
endeavored to separate the two. Church leaders naturally aligned themselves with the 
Conservative party in response.79 Liberal efforts to separate Church and state and the 
relative peace of the 1930s would not last for long. 
To set the stage for the conflict to come, we must observe that Church 
involvement in political and physical battles in Colombia is not without historical 
precedent. In the 1870s, Conservatives who had grown weary of a decade and a half of 
Liberal rule, and clergy weary of the associated Church-state separation, engaged in a 
clergy-led war characterized by religious zeal. Oquist notes: “in 1876, the Church was the 
recruiting office of the Conservative insurrectional armies.”80 While the Church remained 
aligned with Conservative politics, in the conflict to come its role was not insurrectional 
but establishmentarian. 
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III. 1930–1960: LA VIOLENCIA 
A. SUMMARY 
La Violencia was a late 1940s-mid 1960s period of extreme violence that began to 
transform Catholicism’s long-privileged position in Colombian society and politics. 
Catholicism was joined with politics and society in Colombia, and its efforts to maintain 
that power and privilege during La Violencia were self-defeating: these efforts catalyzed 
public disenchantment with the Church and galvanized support for nascent Protestant 
missions in the country. These dynamics set the footings for the impending wane in 
Catholic influence. This chapter makes observations about La Violencia and its effects on 
the Catholic establishment, its social and political position, and the emerging Protestant 
wave. 
B. PRECURSORS AND CAUSES 
Catholic anti-Protestantism was potent prior to La Violencia. To Catholic leaders, 
religious unity meant national unity and was critical to retaining their privilege. Levine 
cites a 1944 Church letter that reflects that idea, referring to the Church as Colombia’s 
“mother ... most precious possession, superior to all others.”81 To Catholic leaders’ 
chagrin, the 1930–1946 Liberal regime did not hinder, and even supported numerous 
Protestant missionary groups that arrived during that time.82 In a 1943 article, Colombian 
priests lamented the government’s open door policy toward foreign missionaries as an 
“erroneous interpretation of ‘tolerance.’” Simultaneously, Protestant organizations 
diverted funds to Latin America from war-torn East Asia, which, according to the same 
article, “lightened the misery of [the] people at the price of its conscience and of the 
country’s religious unity.”83 
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Another 1944 Church letter, addressed to the U.S. Ambassador, bemoaned the 
influx of North American Protestant missionaries that, in the Monseñor author’s words, 
“treat us as if we were a country of savages in need of civilization. They are doing us no 
good ... whose nation’s principal unifying link is the Catholic faith that we all profess.” 
The Monseñor called upon President Roosevelt to “impede missionaries of impiety and 
division from traveling to Colombia ... who work to destroy the national unity and to 
thrust the country into serious conflict.”84 The Ambassador’s reply called for tolerance of 
legal activities, arguing that “certainly in Colombia such activities are specifically 
protected under law.”85 
Anti-Protestant publicity promulgated by Catholic leaders was rife. In November 
of 1944, the Revista Javeriana published an article suggesting that Communists were 
using Protestantism to infiltrate and dominate Colombia.86 Other Catholic leaders 
characterized Protestants as a “danger” promulgating “sinister foreign propaganda.”87  
One leader, Eugenio Restrepo Uribe, argued that the sheer quantity of Protestant 
missionaries overshadowed the Church’s resources to evangelize in areas under-educated 
in Catholicism. He called for the State to defend Catholicism against “the Protestant virus 
that destroys national unity and produces ever-more provocative acts.” Restrepo argued 
that a national anti-Protestant committee to support a “unified, methodical, systematic, 
and organized [campaign] across the entirety of Colombia should be an absolute 
priority.”88 His words eerily foreshadowed the terror to come. 
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1. Gaitán: The Catalyst 
A new radical Liberal leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, emerged in the lead-up to the 
1946 elections. Gaitán’s focus on the strength of the general population stood at odds 
with the two-party elitist system that survived in Colombia after fading in neighboring 
countries.89 He divided Liberal support between the working class and those of higher 
status. Gaitán ran for president against a Conservative candidate and an establishment 
Liberal, and with Liberal votes divided, Conservatives re-took power that year.90  
The 1946 transition of power mirrored the events of 1930 discussed in the 
preceding chapter. Knowing that Liberals outnumbered them,91 newly empowered 
Conservatives tried to form a coalition government, but many could not resist the lure of 
returning vengeance to Liberals for their 1930 aggression. Such violence increased as 
early as 1946.92  
Emerging from 16 years of Liberal governments curtailing its privileged status, 
and aligned with the newly risen Conservative regime, the Church entered headlong into 
the fray. Levine recognizes, however, that a significant faction realized that politicizing 
the Church would disillusion the half of Colombians who identified with the Liberal 
perspective.93 Indeed, dissenting Catholics argued that love, the basis of Christianity, was 
undermined by partisan odiousness, but although some Catholic leaders attempted 
neutrality,94 Rodolfo Ramón de Roux calls the political–religious situation in Colombia a 
Gordian Knot, where there was no apparent way to untie the two.95 By the time La 
Violencia surged in 1948, the Church had so aligned itself with conservative politics that 
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it viewed anything liberal as anti-Church. Many Catholic leaders incited their followers 
to organize against the Liberals.96 
2. El Bogotazo 
The 1946 partisan violence was strong, but fiercer carnage was to come. Gaitán 
was assassinated in 1948, igniting an anti-Conservative maelstrom in Bogotá that came to 
be called El Bogotazo.97 It was an unconscionably violent, chaotic, “uncontainable 
human tide.”98 In response, Conservatives rained gunfire from Church towers (whether 
government forces or priests were firing is unknown); Liberals below, equating the 
Church with the Conservative State, ravaged Church properties.99 Conservatives used 
government assets in retaliation, powerfully oppressing Liberals (or those perceived to be 
so-aligned).100 Three thousand Colombians died within a 36-hour period.101 Both parties 
actively organized violence against each other, and Conservatives held power for twelve 
years of horror. 
C. GENERAL CHARACTER OF LA VIOLENCIA 
As El Bogotazo quickly spread to the countryside, Catholic leaders encouraged 
the poor to retain dignity by diligently continuing their under-compensated toils, 
insinuating that “poverty was less a product of the social structure ... than a result of the 
faulty habits of the poor.”102 But author Eduardo Galeano asks what many in Colombia at 
the time may have asked: “Is it right to confuse the prosperity of one class with the well-
being of a country?”103  
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The conflict enveloped all strata of the population. Galeano continues: “The war 
reached the extremes of unbelievable cruelty, spurred by an eagerness of vengeance that 
grew as the war spread.”104 Banditry—executed by bandoleros—was the custom; its 
activity found pleasure in the suffering of others and even involved children in its 
diabolic desensitization, turning live human bodies into objects of violent child’s play.105 
Norman Bailey’s description of the situation is heart-rending: 
Certain techniques of death and torture became so common and 
widespread that they were given names, such as “picar para tamal,” 
which consisted of cutting up the body of the living victim into small 
pieces, bit by bit. Or “bocachiquiar,” a process which involved making 
hundreds of small body punctures from which the victim slowly bled to 
death. Ingenious forms of quartering and beheading were invented.... 
Crucifixions and hangings were commonplace, political “prisoners” were 
thrown from airplanes in flight, infants were bayoneted, schoolchildren, 
some as young as eight years old, were raped en masse, unborn infants 
were removed by crude Caesarian section and replaced by roosters, ears 
were cut off, scalps removed, and so on.106 
The expense of this fratricide was immense. Estimates of its cost in life vary 
greatly, but one estimate claims up to 280,000 Colombians killed between 1948–58 
alone.107 Table 2 presents a more conservative year-by-year estimate starting in 1948, 
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Table 2.   La Violencia Deaths By Year 
 
Adapted from: Paul H. Oquist, Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia (New York: 
Academic Press), 1980, 6–7. Oquist cites Dr. Carlos Lemoine of the Compañía 
Colombiano [sic] de Datos as his data source.  
D. POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS 
The two Colombian parties endeavored earnestly for the loyalty of campesinos, 
who comprised election-deciding power in Colombia’s pre-industrial, highly rural 
society. Conservatives aimed to blur the distinction between religion and politics, 
attempting to draw the Catholic faithful to its political cause.108 
Conservative Laureano Gómez came to power in an uncontested 1949 election, 
with his non-democratic rise favored by Catholic leadership.109 President from 1950–
1953, Gómez “personified the clerical-authoritarian tradition of Spain. He voiced the 
kind of Hispanicism and Catholicism to which a considerable part of the Colombian 
people were attached. He restricted civil liberties, and began systematically to hunt down 
Liberal leaders.”110 Gómez was a catalyst for violence and was unflinchingly devoted to 
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the Catholic establishment;111 he was considered “more Catholic than the Pope.”112 
Palacios observes that although the Church enjoyed support in the early 1950s from the 
Gómez regime, its apparent health was deceptive as the rise of media, alternative 
educational opportunities, and an urban middle class all increased.113  
According to Robert Dix, “amid the political and moral degeneration of 
Colombian life [Gómez] saw himself in the role of purifying knight,”114 but even many 
Conservatives were wary of the constitutional changes he proposed. Therefore, all 
partisan groups except those closest to Gómez supported a 1953 military coup that 
installed General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla as president.115 Political violence tempered, but it 
was quickly apparent that the motivations behind the violence had shifted from primarily 
political to economic: a hodgepodge of social and criminal motivations that continued 
even in a semi-stable political environment.116 Party leaders were powerless to stop the 
“continuing bloodletting in the countryside.”117 
In 1953 the State entrusted the Church with sweeping authority over civil affairs 
in over 60% of the territory, an area labeled “mission territories.”118 Rojas also shared 
Gómez’s attitude toward Protestants, linking them with Communism.119 Parallel with 
Rojas’ rise to power and complementary to his disdain for Protestants, a Vatican 
concordat in 1953 gave Catholicism “exclusive rights to evangelization and education in 
missionary areas.”120 
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In spite of Rojas’ Conservative leanings, he was progressive in his own right; he 
introduced television to Colombia, instituted welfare programs, and drove the success of 
women’s suffrage.121 Although Rojas was ostensibly Conservative, Catholic leaders 
could not stay on his side in the face of liberal reforms that threatened Church interests 
and authority; the Church supported Rojas’ overthrow.122 Whether the Church ultimately 
endorsed them or not, J. Lloyd Mecham contends that “there is little doubt that the 
Colombian governments of Laureano Gómez and Rojas Pinilla encouraged and abetted 
the persecution of the Protestants.”123 
A 1957 countercoup returned the country to (procedural) democracy in 1958 
under the Frente Nacional, a power-sharing agreement between Conservatives and 
Liberals that gradually reduced the political violence.124 The engine behind La 
Violencia’s perpetuation was mutual fear of extermination between Liberals and 
Conservatives; the Frente Nacional largely defused that fear.125 The Church broadly 
supported the Frente Nacional and sought to separate itself from partisan politics 
(although not from politics in general), recognizing the animosity that its polarizing 
Conservative alignment had caused within the national culture.126  
E. THE CHURCH’S RELATIONSHIP TO VIOLENCE 
Following the Church’s marginalization under the 1930–1946 Liberal regimes, 
Catholic leadership was prepared for retributional war. Gonzalo Sánchez elaborates on 
political-religious collusion: “the Church put all of its institutional weight on the side of 
governmental power. It simultaneously anathematized the opposition and offered the 
Kingdom of God to the government’s terrorist bands. It not only legitimated the plans of 
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the government, but it also helped to realize them.”127 Even after the Frente Nacional 
came into effect, reports of power-hungry clergy fomenting violence remained. Paul 
Oquist cites a 1962 police report, in which “the activity of the clergy [was] considered 
notably counterproductive in many [municipalities].”128 Elaborating, he observes that 
“there were pistol-carrying priests who directly led their own cliques in battles against 
opposing groups after inspiring Sunday masses.”129 
Although the party line was the rule among Catholics, some clergy opposed the 
Conservative establishment. One example was Fidel Blandon Berrío, who “sided with the 
persecuted [Liberal peasantry] at a time when the Church hierarchy held that the only 
path for a Christian was to embrace the government’s cause.”130 Mecham also notes 
some higher Catholic leadership’s concern about ecclesiastical connections to violence, 
citing a letter that encouraged priests to avoid political polarization. Nevertheless, he 
continues, “many of the fanatical clergy paid no attention to the warning... but fed the 
hate for Liberals.”131 Antonio García’s sentiments as quoted by Vernon Lee Fluharty 
remain overarching:  
The villages burned, the children mutilated in their schools, the jails filled 
to overflowing with prisoners denied a trial or a judge, the men castrated 
in cold blood, those tortured in police dungeons, the women killed after 
being subjected to ignominy, the gagged press, the dwellings leveled by 
some functionary under arms, these ... brought moral ruin and the most 
abject complicity.... These hundreds of thousands of dead, of exiled, of 
fugitives, killed or shriveled the souls of everyone. But especially they left 
their stain on the only spiritual and political power that might have been 
able to disarm the government and the parties. In place of religious and 
human reasons, the Church preferred ‘Political Reason.’132  
                                                 
127 Gonzalo Sánchez, “The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis,” in Violence in Colombia: The 
Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, ed. Charles W. Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo 
Sánchez (Wilmington, DE: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 87. 
128 “Criminalidad En 1962” (República de Colombia, Policía Nacional, F-2, n.d.), 140; quoted in 
Oquist, Violence, Conflict, and Politics, 219. 
129 Oquist, Violence, Conflict, and Politics, 220. 
130 Sánchez and Bakewell, “New Research, New Questions,” 795. 
131 Mecham, Church and State in Latin America, 134. 
132 Antonio García, Gaitán y el Problema de la Revolucion Colombiana (Bogotá: Artes Graficas, 
1955), 334–5; quoted in Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 121. 
 32
Elizabeth Brusco quotes one person’s account exhibiting that argument: “I heard 
the priest say from the pulpit that by the mere fact of being a Liberal you were already 
body and soul in hell, and [by] the fact of being a Conservative you were already body 
and soul in heaven.”133  
While church leaders mixed religion and politics, bandits, known as bandoleros, 
mixed religion and violence. Carlos A. Leon notes that they were paradoxically often 
quite religious: one leader was known to lead his bandit group in prayer together, another 
surgically embedded a crucifix under his skin, still another claimed God-given 
invincibility (he was eventually shot and killed).134 Bandoleros exhibited a “coexistence 
of religious norms with attitudes of rejection and antagonism to these norms … for 
example, when a bandit prays for good luck in killing, he implicitly breaks the command 
‘thou shalt not kill.’ Prayers, religious images, crucifixes, and scapularies are used as 
magical instruments (amulets) to protect the selfish interest of the subject in the 
performance of criminal and cruel acts.”135 Such venal use of Catholicism at the personal 
level reflected the example set in Colombia by the institution itself. 
One mid-nineteenth century missionary in New Granada (now Colombia) 
“claimed that the Church fostered ‘mere ceremonies irrespective of any exercises of the 
heart.’”136 From a psychiatric perspective, Leon observes that being forced to practice 
religious rites without believing in them develops internal rebellion against them that can 
manifest once the controlling forces are removed.137 Leon also observes that despotic 
father figures were common among what would become bandoleros.138 This parallels the 
general roles of governmental and Catholic authorities in the lives of Colombian 
campesinos before La Violencia. They were rebelling against what they saw as a despot. 
                                                 
133 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 45. 
134 Leon, “Unusual Patterns of Crime,” 1570. 
135 Ibid., 1573. 
136 Holton, New Granada, 181; cited in Orozco, “Not to Be Called Christian,” 178. 
137 Leon, “Unusual Patterns of Crime,” 1573. 
138 Ibid., 1571. 
 33
We must note that bandoleros of both parties roamed with destruction in their 
wake. Fluharty quotes Time correspondent Philip Payne describing the arrival of a 
Liberal band to a Conservative town. As young as 14 with a leader of 25, the Liberals 
terrorized the town and executed Conservative leaders. In spite of its violence, however, 
this narrative contrasts with common accounts of Conservative atrocities; killing in this 
case was mostly focused on Conservative leaders and absent was the mutilation and 
torture most often associated with Conservative banditry. The leader prohibited sexual 
abuse of women (although perhaps solely because his female crony forbade it) and he 
protected the church and school from vandalism.139 For the purposes of this thesis we 
must ask how Conservative-perpetrated atrocities affected Protestants and whether they 
engaged in the same violence observed of these Liberal bandoleros. 
F. PROTESTANTS REPRESSED 
When the Liberals were ousted in 1946 after 16 years in power, much of the 
freedom that Protestants had enjoyed disappeared; the new Conservative government 
argued that most such rights were extra-constitutional.140 After the major outbreak of 
violence that began in 1948, Protestants were broadly repressed. The Encyclopedia of 
Christianity records the killing of “thousands” and destruction or closure of 270 schools 
and 60 churches associated with Protestants.141 Conservatives saw Protestantism as a 
“divisive and antipatriotic” threat to national security that “opened the way for foreign 
schemes that with time would destroy the nation.”142 For example, Fluharty recounts the 
Gómez regime’s policy of extermination under which there would be no due process for 
its Protestant enemies. But he continues, contending that the Church hierarchy was not to 
blame for such cruelty.143 Quoting Félix Restrepo, Fluharty argues that “the violence has 
been carried out in the name of religion, against the will of the Catholic Church, to which 
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the fanatical clergy paid no attention.”144 Mecham echoes that sentiment, holding that 
“the persecution of Protestant missionaries [was] unrelated to the Conservative-Liberal 
conflict, [but] a byproduct of the general spirit of lawlessness and religious 
fanaticism.”145 His claim, however, belies the situation he proceeds to describe. There 
was persistent presidential and high-level Catholic strategizing against Protestantism: 
“departmental governors were instructed to take all steps to terminate religious activities 
of non-Catholic groups.”146 
The Church availed itself of the opportunity to justify violence against its 
detractors. Cornelia Butler Flora tells of priests giving homilies condemning Protestants 
as Liberal subversives and often directly inflaming followers toward “elimination of 
Protestants.”147 She also cites numerous accounts of terror against Pentecostals by 
Conservative bandits and officials. In one case, a pastor and his congregants were knifed 
in church by a band led by the local police inspector.148 Conservatives severely 
oppressed the country’s small, budding Protestant base. Since most Protestants were 
politically liberal, observes Brusco, they were “doubly damned during a time when 
Liberal Party affiliation alone was sufficient for getting oneself killed.”149 Protestants in 
Colombia “suffered stoning, beatings, and the constant threat of death.”150 While, as 
previously noted, Conservative records reveal similar violence against their own at the 
hand of Liberals in general,151 accounts of Protestants responding in violence are absent. 
Although this chapter focuses on a period characterized by violence, other means 
of anti-Protestant repression existed as well. One nonviolent way the Catholic enterprise 
emphasized its authority was through prohibiting individual ownership of Bibles and 
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literature. Patrols roaming the country to confiscate weapons also confiscated Bibles, 
which the military establishment viewed as “equally as dangerous as arms.”152 
Conservatives burned confiscated books, saying “that smoke smells like Protestants.”153 
One Colombian Protestant recalled getting caught with a Bible by a priest, who told him, 
“don’t you know that it’s prohibited, that you don’t understand it? Don’t you know that 
you shouldn’t be doing that?”154 Free thought outside the Catholic hierarchy’s control 
threatened its power and legitimacy. 
Responding to Protestant cries for justice, Catholic officials did not deny that 
atrocities occurred, but argued that it was not an “organized persecution.” The Church 
claimed that individuals were to blame for such acts, and that it emphatically “opposed 
violence and religious hate.”155 Furthermore, the Church argued that Catholics were also 
victims of violence and that it cannot be assumed that Protestant victims were killed 
because of their faith; most Protestants were Liberals, after all. Protestants remained 
adamant that Conservatives, Catholics included, exercised vendettas against them during 
La Violencia.156 
G. PROTESTANT RESILIENCE 
Although the Catholic hierarchy was hostile toward any non-Church-sanctioned 
form of organization, Protestants in Colombia consider La Violencia “the Period of 
Awakening.”157 Brusco juxtaposes the pervasive attitude of Protestants against that of 
Catholics at the time: a Protestant pastor she quotes said, “when you really understand 
what God is saying, he isn’t ordering you to hate and detest anyone”; predominant 
Catholic doctrine, on the other hand, asserted that heaven was to be gained by opposing, 
even killing Liberals.158 Given the persecution converts underwent, becoming a 
                                                 
152 Flora, Pentecostalism in Colombia, 45. 
153 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 43. 
154 Ibid., 44. 
155 Roux, Estado de Alerta, 73. Translations mine. 
156 Ibid., 73–74. 
157 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 13. 
158 Ibid., 41, 45. 
 36
Protestant required deep commitment.159 Closed churches divided into homes, bringing 
them closer to “the Colombian reality”160 and into areas the Catholic authority had long 
controlled, like marriage and education.161 When persecution waned and such house-
churches reunified, the increase in size from the original church was exponential.162 
When persecution against them was strongest, Protestants multiplied. 
Despite widespread insecurity, Protestant church membership increased 50% in 
the first five years of the conflict, from 8,000 in 1948 to 12,000 in 1953.163 According to 
Benjamín Haddox, Protestants grew from 0.18% of the population in 1937 to 1.17% in 
1960.164 Table 3 (in Chapter VI) exhibits Protestant growth during the century 1905–
2005 from an additional source. Statistics vary significantly during this era, and different 
sources include or exclude various sects, but one thing is certain: the Protestant 
community was putting in roots. The formation of the Evangelical Missionary Council 
between 1937–1942 and the Evangelical Union of the Churches of Colombia in 1950 
fostered growth by unifying the manifold Protestant groups in the country.165 Brusco 
makes a critical observation: “the ‘explosion’ coincided with the period of least foreign 
missionary involvement.”166 Although foreign missionaries laid the early groundwork, 
they were not primarily responsible for the exceptional Protestant growth. While 
Catholicism was fragmenting, Protestants unified. Colombians were evangelizing 
themselves. 
H. CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS 
Initially, Catholic leaders perceived their role during La Violencia as defenders of 
a moral social order that was under Liberal assault, but as violence degenerated into 
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savagery, the Church gradually shifted its perspective. Catholic leaders acknowledged 
that what they previously assumed was a unanimously Catholic populace was a facade: 
“In a word, we must admit that in many cases, unfortunately, Catholicism is on the lips, 
but not in the depths of heart and spirit.”167 
In retrospect, Colombian Catholic officials consistently cite the carnage of La 
Violencia as cause for the Church to remain separated from politics, recognizing that past 
political linkages, whether nominal or radical, led to violence that threatened the Church 
itself.168 From the hierarchy’s perspective, La Violencia redefined Colombia as a mission 
field: a broken people confused by a broken and inconsistent Church.169 A new definition 
of the Church itself was required. Levine contrasts the two options: the first, an 
ecclesiastical hierarchy from which flows unified doctrine and authority, and the second, 
which stresses the church as a concept of community and common experience, unifying a 
non-hierarchical body. In the second case, “institutional unity [depends] on social 
unity.”170 This new conceptualization reversed earlier doctrine that the institutional 
Church is what unified the nation. The Church’s political and social privilege was 
threatened, and the new paradigm required the Church to conform rather than dictate—a 
pill not easily swallowed. 
I. ANALYSIS 
Some topics surrounding the foregoing narrative warrant further examination. 
First, we consider how Colombia’s shifting social and political paradigms forced the 
Church to change its own methods. We ask how the Church’s connections with La 
Violencia’s atrocities affected its moral authority, as well as whether any evidence exists 
that might in any way vindicate the Church. Furthermore, given Catholicism’s cultural 
nature and the intense coercive forces at work in Colombia’s La Violencia era society, we 
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evaluate whether statistics showing near-complete Catholic adherence among 
Colombians can be trusted. Finally, we briefly discuss how La Violencia contributed to 
the genesis of today’s guerrilla conflict. 
1. Shifting Paradigms 
One way the Catholic Church attempted to modernize its methods was through 
the concept of Catholic Action, its incipient stab at popular engagement policy. From the 
1930s through the 1960s, the Church supported and engaged in advisorship over social 
organizations including agricultural and labor groups. By the end of La Violencia, 
however, those groups—especially labor—clamored for autonomy from Church 
oversight, even while the Church restructured itself to more effectively maintain 
control.171 This thesis further discusses Catholic Action’s metamorphosis after La 
Violencia in Chapter IV. Levine explains that as traditional concepts of authority shift, 
“new patterns of legitimation, organization, and action emerge to reshape the way Church 
leaders see the popular and build links to it.” A similar reciprocal process occurs as 
popular organization reflects changes in social dynamics and available options.172 
Protestantism was leading among those available options. Its diffuse presence 
endeavored to meet people where they were and was generally unencumbered by 
hierarchies and power plays. Brusco cites David Stoll, corroborated with her own 
research, to confirm that most Protestants were not politically radical. Many Protestants, 
being non-hierarchical, eschew politics altogether as unimportant in the face of 
eternity.173 Protestantism challenged the traditions of Catholicism with a “geographically 
smaller and metaphysically larger” community of brothers and sisters rather than fathers 
and mothers.174  
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After the 1959 Cuban Revolution, North American missionaries began to present 
“Protestantism as a ‘spiritual alternative to Communism.’”175 This contrasted with the 
Catholic perspective. Oquist cites a series of accounts of Catholic leaders opining against 
Liberalism and exhorting Catholics that no true believer can in good conscience vote for 
anyone other than a Conservative.176 In equating Protestantism with Liberals (generally 
accurate), Catholics also equated Protestantism with Communism (generally erroneous) 
and thus, ironically, “the [Colombian leftist ideal] to overthrow the cross, crush Christ, 
[and] eliminate Religion.”177 The oddness in these claims is that atheistic Communism is 
diametrically opposed to the Protestant gospel. Herein a broadly applicable problem of 
intertwining religion and politics becomes apparent. Spurious associations become not 
only accepted, but also embraced. 
2. On Catholicism’s Moral Authority 
There is some consensus that Catholic involvement in violence and repression 
rendered its moral authority hollow. Robert H. Dix contends that regardless of whether 
the Church was officially political or not, it was impotent to fulfill “its potential role as 
pacifier in the years when Colombia cried out for someone to save the nation from the 
mounting wave of political violence. The Church was quite frequently identified, through 
word or deed, with acts of violence on the Conservative side.”178 Citing Antonio García, 
Dix argues that the Church favored politics over faith and humanity.179 Some victims of 
that Catholic political priority were Protestant believers. 
James E. Goff’s 1965 study on Protestant persecution during La Violencia 
comprises the first comprehensive study of this specific aspect of such a widely examined 
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time period.180 His team investigated the issue through direct contact with witnesses in 
all of Colombia’s departments.181 He describes La Violencia as “a medieval type of 
ecclesiastical pressure for religious uniformity [that] conflicted with modern concepts of 
constitutional democracy.”182 While professing that his research is centered on an 
ambition to increase tolerance in Colombia, and seeks “benefit to the Roman Catholic 
Church,”183 Goff affirms that the co-identification between the Catholic Church and the 
Conservative Party enabled, and even encouraged Protestant persecution.184  
Goff addresses the opposite end of the issue that this thesis is concerned with: He 
examines the causes of Protestant persecution, but not necessarily the effects of it. 
Nevertheless, his study corroborates claims about anti-Protestant violence during La 
Violencia and links the persecution to politics. Goff confirms that it was “the political 
situation which made the persecution possible,”185 but takes care to differentiate between 
political and religious violence in his analysis.186 
3. Criticism of Adherent Statistics 
The analysis Goff provides goes beyond politics, however, and touches on matters 
of Church ritual as it relates with individuals. He describes Colombian Catholic devotion 
as “mechanical,” quoting Orlando Fals-Borda: “Religion means principally to meet the 
requirements of the Church and to follow the dictates of the priests—a devotion to the 
Church as an institution rather than to Christianity as a way of life.”187 And institutional 
it was. The 1887 concordat described the Catholic Church as “the religion of the nation,” 
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and “‘an essential element of the social order,’ [implying] that it is a political duty of the 
State to protect and respect the Church.”188 The concordat further charged the Church 
with the legal administration of birth, marriage, and death, as well as control over “all 
levels” of education.189 After a 1973 renovation, the new concordat text, although 
officially “without prejudice to the legitimate freedom of other religious faiths and their 
respective members,” continued to declare a similar ethos as its predecessor: “the State, 
observing the traditional Catholic ethos within the Colombian nation, considers the 
Catholic Religion, the Apostolic and Roman Church as the fundamental element for the 
public good and for the integral development of the nation’s community.”190 But official 
as the Church was, and delimited as adherents were by its control, we must ask what 
portion of the population truly held Catholicism in their hearts. 
Another helpful component of Goff’s dissertation is his analysis of religious 
statistics. He argues briefly but convincingly against the veracity of statistics showing the 
Catholic population of Colombia in the upper 90% range.191 Goff argues that the social 
proof provided by La Violencia’s atrocities reveals an acute absence of the Christian 
ethos supposed to be a harbinger of true Catholicism.192 His perspective in this respect 
supports the hypothesis that if Colombians felt security in speaking their minds, fewer 
would profess Catholicism than the statistics reveal. 
The preceding point is critical to understanding the persecution of Protestants, 
argues Goff. Upholding a distorted view of Colombia as near-unanimously Catholic gave 
increased leverage to Church and government policies aimed at suppressing competitors: 
“The religious intolerance of the Conservative Party and the Catholic Church’s 
determination to stop Protestant growth produced the religious persecution which began 
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in serious form in 1948.”193 One principal means that the Catholic Church used to that 
end was its monopoly on public education, Goff contends.194 Such a powerful and 
pervasive avenue through which the Church pursued “social cleansing” might be usefully 
contrasted with the level of present-day religious influence in Colombian education as 
one measure of the current political implications of religious shifts. 
4. Optimistic Perspectives on Catholic Roles 
Goff’s research synthesizes well with Roux’s work to provide a fairly balanced 
image of players and motivations during La Violencia. When he wrote in 1983, Roux 
argued that the Catholic Church remained “hegemonic” in Colombia.195 Where Goff 
rejects outright the idea that Catholic influence in Colombian politics could be rooted in a 
unanimously Catholic population, Roux allows for the possibility.196 He echoes Goff’s 
assessment that religion and politics were inextricably intertwined in Colombia, likening 
the situation to a “Gordian Knot.”197 Nevertheless, Roux emphasizes much more the 
pervasive Catholic argument that any persecution that did occur was related to the 
subversive nature of Protestant groups rather than their religious doctrine. Where Goff 
refutes such claims with evidence, however, Roux emphasizes more the prolific nature of 
such claims by Catholic leaders without as much examination of those claims’ validity. 
The title of his book, “A Church in a State of Alert,” on its own reveals the focus of his 
discussion: how the Catholic Church felt toward Protestants and what it did about those 
sentiments. Although Roux explains that the post-La Violencia government, the Frente 
Nacional, bolstered Catholic institutionalization at the “hub of national unification,”198 he 
cites a 1976 Catholic pastoral letter insinuating changes afoot, but belying its own claims. 
The letter claimed that the Catholic Church does not consist in nor differentiate between 
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political parties, cultures, or ideologies—but also condemned groups vying for radical 
socio-political transformation in Colombia.199 
Vernon Lee Fluharty expands upon that apparent contradiction, observing that 
“when basic issues threaten, neither Church matters nor party labels differentiate the 
Conservative and Liberal upper levels.”200 He contends that the Church hierarchy was not 
to blame for the “barbarity” of La Violencia because just as politics remained vertically 
disparate, so did the Church.201 Quoting Félix Restrepo, he argues that “the violence has 
been carried out in the name of religion, against the will of the Catholic Church, to which 
the fanatical clergy paid no attention, as happened in Spain.”202 Accounts exist to evidence 
that there were clergy who opposed Gómez’s policies.203 But in spite of Fluharty’s attempt 
to at least partially exonerate the Church, he echoes Antonio García, recognizing that 
during La Violencia, the Church favored political power over moral integrity, a position 
that tainted the metaphysical authority it could have used to temper the violence.204 
5. Evolving Nature of the Conflict: Emerging Guerrillas 
As Palacios argues, however, partisan conflict cannot be blindly blamed for La 
Violencia’s atrocities. He notes that different guerrilla groups identified with and 
protected different societal groups ranging from Protestants in one region to Communists 
in another (and certainly Catholics in many), and argues that the traditional Liberal versus 
Conservative narrative quickly grew irrelevant, especially in the countryside.205 Palacios 
recognizes that the danger that—initially—political persecution wrought on life in el 
campo drove “many prominent Liberals from small towns to the relative safety of the 
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cities,” leaving remnant guerrillas behind. Free from the influence of traditional political 
ideology, such remnant groups more easily turned radical.206 
J. CONCLUSION 
Mid-twentieth century events in Colombia set the footings for social and political 
transformation. As it concerned the Catholic Church, La Violencia was a time of 
confusion, inconsistency, and division. Such a vertically oriented institution could not 
maintain its traditional privilege in the face of horizontally integrated competition. The 
Church’s reactionary and elitist nature precluded its leadership from unifying adherents 
under a common vision, something that came more naturally to the Protestant movement. 
It was not Protestantism’s growth, however, that caused Catholicism to falter. The 
Church’s own reactive and parochial policies that emphasized its elite political—and 
thereby social—positions rendered it ill prepared to take on the coming era of civil 
society growth. Ondina and Justo González describe the period from 1930–1960 as a time 
of confused Catholic identity from which the Church emerged subservient rather than 
authoritative.207 Although statistics reveal that a sustained decrease in Catholic adherents 
did not happen until after 1970,208 the political, social, and religious dynamics described 
herein comprise the groundwork for that impending change. 
The Colombian Catholic Church’s historical privilege rendered it too political to 
be a guardian of moral substance. Inasmuch, the Church felt threatened by even the 
minute Protestant presence that entered the scene shortly before La Violencia. Whereas in 
some Latin American countries the Church adapted more positively, in Colombia, the 
Catholic response to the Protestant threat was destructive rather than preservative. It 
alienated adherents and catalyzed converts, but more importantly, it opened the eyes of a 
public in the birthing throes of a new era of social arrangements and participation. It 
exposed the dark in an institution that was supposed to house the Light, and paved the 
way for the decline in Catholic prominence to come. 
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IV. 1960–1990: THE FRENTE NACIONAL AND VATICAN II 
A. SUMMARY 
Although the Frente Nacional placated mainstream political squabbles and 
successfully diminished violence, by the 1960s new matters to resolve arose in the social 
arena. Under the Frente Nacional, battles between Liberals and Conservatives for 
political posts essentially ceased, but Colombian politics remained oligarchic even while 
superficially democratic norms predominated. This political arrangement coincided with 
big changes in Catholicism.  
After La Violencia, the Church’s traditional goal of keeping Colombia 100% 
Catholic209 continued to drive its power-based strategies, even as global Catholicism 
evolved toward new social realities. Catholic Action, Vatican II, and the 1968 Medellín 
bishops’ conference all endeavored to advance social engagement by the Church, but 
Colombian Catholic leaders remained divided between retaining privilege and redefining 
purpose. This internal division increased the momentum away from Catholic unity and 
authority that La Violencia had precipitated. By the late 1960s a number of Catholics 
including some priests were speaking out against the hierarchy and its power-centric, 
class-based ideologies,210 but Cold War pressures and a violence-weary public prevented 
these apparently (and in some cases, genuinely) revolutionary movements from capturing 
a greater following.  Simultaneously, the reshaping of traditional social structures by 
forces like urbanization and industrialization undermined traditional Catholic authority 
spheres. The newly socialized public began to seek meaning in new places as Catholic 
strategy consistently remained one step behind. The Church publicly shied away from 
overt political influence at the elite level, but remained informally committed to retaining 
its privilege in the political sphere. This divided mentality prevented the Church from 
exceling as either an oligarchical player or a class-neutral humanitarian.  
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B. SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATIONS 
A number of transformations took place in the Church and in Colombian society 
during this time period. Catholic doctrine and policies (both global and local), Church-
state relations, and societal trends are among these shifts, as the following sections 
illustrate. 
1. Vatican II 
In 1959, Pope John XXIII convened the second Vatican Council to “better 
prepare [the church] to deal with the changing world.”211 Between 1962–1965, the 
Council shifted Catholic norms, emphasizing the role of the laity in leadership, 
deconstructing such institutional traditions as the Latin mass, encouraging local leaders to 
innovate, and shifting ministry focus from hierarchy-shaped to socially minded, base-
level endeavors like poverty eradication rather than simply teaching hope in eternal 
spiritual riches—all while re-affirming Papal inerrancy in conjunction with Biblical 
truth.212 Thus, while the Catholic Church was transforming in ways previously 
unthinkable, it remained patently institutional. In Colombia, the most conservatively 
Catholic country in Latin America, Pope John XXIII’s initiative toward social justice met 
with conflict among the Church hierarchy, while other neighboring countries, especially 
Brazil, more readily embraced the new doctrine.213 Especially in Colombia, social 
change outpaced Catholic innovation, and competing ideologies espoused by radical 
political groups and Protestant missions caught the hearts and minds of many. Even some 
who remained within Catholicism began to rise against the Colombian Catholic 
establishment. 
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2. Camilo Torres  
A Catholic priest, Camilo Torres was a Liberation Theologian just slightly ahead 
of his time.214 His prominence as a descendant of one of Colombia’s founding fathers by 
the same name, and his position as National University of Bogotá chaplain gave him a 
peculiarly potent voice.215 He argued that there could be no “Christian solution” to social 
ills without political action.216 Torres argued publicly for a revolution—peaceful if elite 
response permitted—of the Colombian society, economy, and government to plug people 
of all social classes into the system.217 When his defamations of the Frente Nacional as a 
non-socially minded ploy of the oligarchy did not result in the reforms he sought, Torres 
formed the United Front and turned Marxist guerrilla. Although he aimed to unify 
progressives in Colombia, Torres was killed in action less than a year after founding the 
movement.218  
Vatican II’s sweeping doctrinal liberalization became official after Torres’ 
radicalization, but before his death.219 Paul E. Sigmund observes that Torres’ story 
strengthened conservative Catholics’ aversions to leftist movements in general, but some 
left-aligned Catholics sympathized with him.220 One year after Torres’ 1966 death, Pope 
Paul VI published an encyclical that “the Wall Street Journal called […] ‘warmed-over 
Marxism.’”221 The pontiff broke ranks with Papal history by emphasizing challenges in 
the developing world, although Berryman surmises that the Pope assumed such 
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challenges would be approached “through consensus rather than struggle.”222 Pope Paul 
VI’s publication fueled efforts by minority clergy groups in various Latin American 
countries, including Colombia, to question traditional Church norms like social privilege 
for clergy, church property ownership, doctrine emphasizing endurance in poverty over 
positive social change for the marginalized, and even the Pope’s aversion to violence by 
referencing cycles of violence that the existing socio-political and economic systems 
precipitated.223 
Camilo Torres was the quintessential example of the transition from La Violencia 
to revolutionary trends under the Frente Nacional in Colombia. But although Catholic 
radicals came to view violence as perhaps necessary to preserve (their conception of) the 
Church, Levine reminds us: “few other nations can offer so stark an example of so much 
violence and bloodshed producing so little social transformation and revolutionary 
change.”224  
3. Catholic Action 
The Church needed a new approach. Levine sets the ironic context: “as national 
political conflicts ceased to provide a central axis of conflict for the Church, politics 
moved within, leading the hierarchy to focus its fears and energies on [countering] the 
threat posed by autonomous popular movements, especially those claiming to act out of 
religious motives or affiliations.”225 Therefore, as La Violencia tapered, the Church 
instituted social programs, seeking to link campesino needs with the central tenets of the 
Church. This countering of popular social mobilization with Church-supervised social 
movements was generally known as Catholic Action. 
Schwaller credits Pius XI (Pope from 1922–1939) as originally promulgating the 
Catholic Action movement, aimed to bring Church elites together with the laity to 
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broaden support for the Church’s strategic aims in society and politics.226 In the second 
half of the 20th century, however, Latin American Catholic Action was generally a 
manifestation of official Church opposition to radical leftist ideologies such as Marxism. 
Catholic laypeople joined into groups purposed to “address social ills in a manner 
consistent with the teachings of the Church, and which was sanctioned and supervised by 
the Church hierarchy in order to counter the leftist movements.”227 In most cases, states 
Schwaller, such groups retained traditional Catholic conservatism and even bordered on 
xenophobic.228 In 1970, Vallier observed that Catholic Action had failed to create the 
synergy it intended; he did not observe notable impacts on campesino values nor on their 
commitment to Catholicism.229 
4. Priest-Government Clashes 
Nevertheless, some priests’ embrace of sectors of the Church’s new social focus 
aggravated authorities to the point of arrest. One such priest was arrested for showing 
solidarity with a campesino land rights claim.230 Ironically, Catholic leadership at this 
point was “profoundly troubled that forces exist in Colombia which attempt to gag 
evangelical freedom with tactics ranging from the subtle labeling as ‘subversive’ or 
‘rebel’ of every priest committed to a social apostolate, all the way to having them put in 
jail.”231 Apparently, prior Catholic opposition to Protestantism on similar terms was not 
primarily doctrinal; it was the fruit of the Church’s coveted status as a political elite—a 
response to a broader fear of losing its grasp on power.  
5. Urbanization’s Effects on Catholic Unity 
Another trend that weakened Church efforts at unifying the country during and 
after La Violencia was urban migration, which shifted the power structures that rural 
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populations formerly supported.232 In the cities, the Catholic-progressive minority 
advocated against traditional hierarchies, emphasizing outreach, transparency, and 
avoidance of politics.233 As in the countryside, this effort aimed to recover from earlier 
political losses due to violence by realigning Church power structures with social trends. 
So-called “Christian revolutionaries,” however, diverted attention from the urban 
progressives’ endeavors. The revolutionaries’ anti-establishment emphasis and openness 
to violence as a legitimate recourse—in the face of a public still freshly terrorized by La 
Violencia—prevented what could have been “a rather widespread movement of 
progressive pressure within the Church”; Colombian Catholicism largely strove to 
maintain its traditionalist, politically authoritative role toward a sea of “loyal and passive 
laymen.”234 
6. Medellín 1968: Latin American Bishops’ Conference 
Outwardly traditional but inwardly divided, Colombia hosted the 1968 Council of 
Latin American Bishops (CELAM; Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano) conference. 
Catholic leaders from across Latin America met in Medellín to examine how Vatican II 
should be executed in the region.235 Notable was that the conference’s agenda did not 
start with doctrine followed by recommendations for application as was the Church’s 
tradition, but rather with observations about society followed by “theological reflections” 
on those conditions.236 This represented a systemic shift in how Catholic leaders related 
to the status quo.  
After years of trivializing the import of class structures, the conference 
represented a movement across Latin America toward encouraging those in lower classes 
to unite in a drive for improved social conditions.237 At the conference, Pope Paul 
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promulgated a new understanding of poverty based on those ideas, but coupled this with 
a clear thesis on violence, defining it as a counter-gospel.238 Previously, Colombian 
Catholic leaders had encouraged the poor to retain dignity by continuing their under-
compensated toils, insinuating that “poverty was less a product of the social structure ... 
than a result of the faulty habits of the poor.”239 But the Pope differed: No longer were 
the poor viewed as individually deficient, but rather as victims of structural deficiencies. 
To that point, Robert G. Wesson observed as late as 1982 that “Colombia has always 
been and remains…an extremely unequal society.” Despite the principal political parties’ 
significant differences, Conservatives and Liberals remained committed to the country’s 
elitist oligarchic order.240 
To reform that structure, revolution became a justifiable option to some;241 
certain Colombian bishops argued that violence goes beyond individual acts, and can 
comprise institutional phenomena—which must be responded to in kind.242 This was in 
contrast to the conference’s collective stance that decried the use of violence, although 
favoring revolutionary concepts over those based in tradition or status quo.243 Of the 
three main social perspectives discussed—”‘traditionalist,’ ‘developmentalist,’ and 
‘revolutionary’”—the conference favored the revolutionary angle in an effort to support 
the popular voice and avoid the “economistic” focus of developmentalism.244 
In the end, although the Council forged a new path for the broader Latin 
American Church following shifts in the social context toward popular Church unity, 
Colombian leaders were among the least responsive to its results, remaining staunchly on 
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the periphery of this new social-revolutionary mentality in spite of hosting the conference 
on their own turf.245 
7. CEBs 
It was also in Medellín that the Church endorsed CEBs (comunidades eclesiales 
de base; base ecclesiastical communities) as an effort toward such social and economic 
liberation.246 The Church’s emphasis on CEBs after the Medellín bishops’ conference 
evidenced a general mentality toward de-institutionalizing the day-to-day practice of 
Catholicism. While CEBs proliferated around Latin America (Sigmund noted that by 
1990 CEB participants in Brazil, for example, had increased to four million),247 their 
proliferation was not so pronounced in Colombia; Church leaders remained divided 
between the positive social aspects of progressive movements and preservation of order 
and traditional Church institutionalism.248 Berryman notes that “many clergy resisted,” 
but even in the reticent Colombian Church there was some support: one of two priests 
who traveled full time around Latin America proliferating CEBs was Colombian.249 
Liberation Theology was at the root of the CEB movement and other Church initiatives 
toward social justice and liberalization of Catholic practice. 
8. Liberation Theology 
The concept of Liberation Theology is traceable to writings by Gustavo Gutierrez, 
an ordained priest who had studied in Europe and lived in the slums of Lima, leading him 
to conclude that “poverty was a destructive thing, something to be fought against and 
destroyed ... that poverty was not accidental ... but the result of a structure ... [and] that 
poor people were a social class. It became crystal clear that in order to serve the poor, one 
had to move into political action.”250 The Medellín conference propelled Gutierrez’s 
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ideas into the Catholic mainstream.251 Most notable, contends Sigmund, is that the 
Medellín conclusions emphasized the concepts of “dependence”—and “liberation” from 
it—for the first time in Latin American Catholicism.252 Dependence, referring to the 
conclusion that Latin America was in essence owned and operated—and sustained—from 
abroad, both at the institutional and individual levels. The Medellín Conference observed: 
“whole populations lacking basic necessities live in such a dependence that it impedes all 
initiative and responsibility, as well as the possibility of cultural promotion and 
participation in social and political life.”253  
By the late 1960s, as social activism melded with political engagement, 
theologians began to distinguish the theology of wealthy hemispheres from that of the 
developing world. While the Word of God remained constant, its application to 
fundamentally different socio-economic environments needed to be considered.254 
“While the Church hierarchy might be allied with conservative political forces,” says 
Schwaller, “a new group of laypersons and clergy emerged for whom issues of social 
equity were part and parcel of the Gospel message. For them the traditional support given 
to the Church hierarchy and its emphasis on structure rather than change did not coincide 
with what they found in the social teachings of the Gospel.”255 
Liberation theology was not as potent in Colombia as in much of Latin America. 
Schwaller argues that between 1960–2000 Liberation Theology rose amid the tumult felt 
in many of the region’s countries as civilian and military regimes traded places with 
inordinate frequency and volatility.256 Although Colombia did experience a brief military 
government interlude in the 1950s under Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the country’s overall 
political stability during the latter half of the 20th century, driven mainly by the Frente 
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Nacional political coalition, stands apart from the hemisphere’s broader experience of 
unstable and repressive government. Sigmund observes that in the mid-1970s, the only 
Latin American countries with “relatively free governments” were Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, and Colombia.257 Berryman takes a slightly less optimistic view, 
describing these four as formally democratic but still “capable of utilizing harsh 
repression.”258 This thesis contends that Liberation Theology’s relatively weak run in 
Colombia was likely less due to the country’s semi-stable democracy, however, and more 
due to the particularly institutionalized nature of Colombian Catholicism. 
Liberation Theology began to fall out of vogue in upper Catholic echelons in the 
1980s. Schwaller cites two main reasons: first, that in practice, Liberation Theology 
tended toward radicalism, and second, that the Pope (John Paul II) was wary of 
advocating “political, social, and economic transformation,” and that such action-minded 
ministry could undermine the theological basis of Catholic doctrine.259 For reasons 
already discussed, these moves impacted Church affairs in Colombia much less than in 
other Latin American countries.  
9. Puebla 
A decade after the Medellín conference, the Church held a follow-up conference 
in Puebla, Mexico. While CELAM leadership envisioned the conference refocusing 
Catholic priorities around Latin American transformation and development rather than 
“liberation from oppression,” the fruit of the conference was less conclusive.260 
Condemning Marxism and violence, emphasizing Church hierarchy, but simultaneously 
promulgating the “preferential option for the poor” concept, regional Catholic tendencies 
had become mostly centrist: desirous of unity in a divided clerical field.261 
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C. SUMMARY OF CATHOLIC CHALLENGES 
By the mid-20th century, argues Schwaller, the Catholic institution’s political 
influence was deteriorating throughout Latin America. This trend continued through the 
epoch this chapter evaluates. Catholic Action’s emphasis on social change over 
institutional structure, coupled with more vocal political dissent within the clergy—of 
which Marxism was a primary motivator—placed the Church on a precipice of 
strategy.262 Its challenges included: deciding whether to continue engaging in political 
alliances, which risk loss of Church prestige when such alliances leave the church on the 
wrong side of political change; a precipitous decline in clergy, both indigenous and 
foreign, driven by improved social and economic opportunities outside the traditional 
ecclesiastical honor sanctum; Cold War challenges, in which Marxism and its affiliates 
spoke to a growing popular yen for social justice that the traditional Church, even under 
Catholic Action, could not effectively answer; and an influx of Protestant missions with 
their proliferating “priesthood of all believers” ideals.263 
While both Communism and Protestantism challenged Catholic norms by 
espousing nontraditional egalitarian principles, Protestantism retained the spiritual-
emotional aspect of faith experience that many Catholics were familiar with.264 The 
Protestant movement thus had a psychological and spiritual edge on Communism in 
overcoming traditional ideologies. Meanwhile, Colombian Catholicism remained among 
the least progressive in the region. 
The Church’s past, present, and future, says Vallier, “become mixed and 
intertwined with each other, creating internal tensions, giving rise to ambiguous public 
actions, and holding effects for many extrareligious events and processes.”265 Among the 
five countries he compared in 1970—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico—
Colombia emerged weakest in his four “comparative dimensions” of progressive Church 
                                                 
262 Schwaller, History of the Catholic Church, 220. 
263 Ibid., 220–3. 
264 Ibid., 223. 
265 Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and Modernization, 22. 
 56
evolution.266 Of particular note is his evaluation that the Colombian Church made zero 
progress in the “development of the priest’s role as pastoral leader and colleague”—that 
is to say, the “bringing [of] religious activities into closer correspondence with the 
sociological bases of the local area”267 that the aforementioned progressives desired to 
further was thwarted by those left in the past (traditionalists), and revolutionaries stuck in 
a short-sighted, violence-willing mentality. In its division, Levine concludes that the 
Church was unable to unify its cause, solidify legitimacy, and connect with a growing 
population that was moving in new directions.268 
D. ANALYSIS 
Respecting the foregoing narrative, a number of areas warrant more detailed 
examination. The following sections consider the Colombian Church’s moves respecting 
budding popular organization, the reliability of adherence statistics, and the effects of 
urbanization and related social trends during the epoch this chapter evaluates. 
1. Trends Toward (and Away from) Popular Linkages 
Although the Frente Nacional protected Catholic social and educational authority, 
and the Church began to reorient its positions toward politically neutral and socially 
equitable policies,269 Dix maintains that such moves were confined to “change within the 
established order.”270 Nevertheless, he contends that the Church might guarantee its 
“permanent political influence” were it able to birth a new “political movement […] 
which effectively promotes the application of Catholic doctrine to contemporary 
problems.”271 Such a change appeared on the horizon under Vatican II,272 but as we have 
seen, its applications in Colombia proved somewhat problematic. Cornelia Butler Flora 
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observes that Colombian Catholic leadership “discouraged Catholics from becoming 
involved in base communities” and that in Colombia, such communities were generally 
very limited, urban, and “highly political.”273  
Commenting on the unique condition of Colombian Catholicism during and after 
the Medellín conference of 1968, David E. Mutchler observes that the stand that 
Colombian bishops took against the progressive, solidarity-driven Medellín documents, 
and the subsequent CELAM rebuff of the Colombian challenge, was a watershed moment 
for what he calls Latin American Catholicism’s fragmentation. His thesis, however, is 
that that fragmentation has its roots in “externally imposed bureaucratization.”274 
Mutchler blames externally driven ecclesiastical staff structures, and cites Camilo Torres’ 
United Front as the key temporal node for intra-church conflict in Colombia. Colombian 
Church leaders had to choose which side they were on, and that choice had local and 
transnational implications. USAID funds, for example, were at stake; external influences 
certainly played a role in ecclesiastical and governmental decision-making in Colombia 
during this period.275 But more than just funds hung in the balance: some such USAID 
funding would aim to research the inner workings of Colombian Catholic decision 
making, with an aim to influence the Church’s stance on controversial issues like birth 
control.276 
The foregoing notwithstanding, Mutchler umbrellas his whole argument under 
“the organizational conflict in Colombia […] that significant sectors of the Church are 
quite prepared to construct bases of power that include only tangential linkages to 
traditional hierarchies.” The former sanctions used by the Church to chide independent 
tendencies in priests ceased to hold their historic power.277 Age, argues Mutchler, 
correlated strongly with these conflicts: older bishops clashed with decades-younger and 
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more cosmopolitan staff members.278 Such distinctions, he contends, refocused power 
from class-based to organization-based nodes: “it is no longer sufficient to examine [the 
Catholic] status system nor its formal hierarchies. Much more salient are the direct and 
indirect linkages that bind Catholic ‘sub-units’ to international sources of logistic and 
financial support and to local political parties, armies, student movements, or other 
elementary power systems.”279  
Mutchler ultimately argues that the implementation of externally mandated staff 
structures in the Colombian Church was “a clear response, or reaction, to Marxist and 
Protestant organizing activities.”280 He concludes that the dysfunction in the Church was 
not primarily associated with perceived threats of Marxism or Protestantism, “but with 
the internal hemorrhaging of the Catholic system” as “the masses were awakening to new 
aspirations of a nonreligious quality, and urbanization and industrialization were 
transforming the peasant societies that had, since the Spanish conquest, provided the 
bishops with a mass base.”281 The staff system intended to modernize Catholic capacity 
to maintain unofficial control backfired as it revealed weak central control structures and 
fragmented Church objectives and resources.  
Mutchler advised in the 1970s that Catholic purposes should center around “real 
poverty and political abstention” if the Church wanted hope of recovery, but 
acknowledged that urbanization and secularization would prove a formidable challenge to 
redeveloping a “mass base.”282 Roux’s analysis follows, concluding that external 
influences such as Vatican II and CELAM pressed Colombian Catholic leaders toward 
tolerance and apoliticalism, while internal forces made it more challenging than in 
neighboring countries for the Catholic institution to disentangle itself from the 
Colombian political system.283 Roux argues that the popular church movement faced 
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some specific challenges in Colombia: with such an institutionalized Catholic tradition, 
other popular organization groups were unsure whether they should embrace such 
popular Catholicism groups or be afraid of them as arms of the central Church. 
Contrarily, the institutional church maintained that the popular church was contrary to its 
universal mandate.284  
Elaborating on the distinction and relationship between these institutional and 
popular veins of Catholicism, Levine argues that two competing definitions of the church 
exist: the first, an ecclesiastical hierarchy from which flows unified doctrine and 
authority, and the second, which stresses the church as a concept of community and 
common experience, thus unifying a non-hierarchical body. In the second case, 
“institutional unity [depends] on social unity.”285 He argues that Colombian Church 
leadership historically took for given their authority’s tentacled relationships with various 
aspects of Colombian life; indeed such relationships were central to Church unity and 
legitimacy.286 The first indication that the Colombian Church was beginning to honestly 
face the prospect of changing societal perspectives on its authority did not come until its 
1969 publication, “La iglesia ante el cambio” (“The Church confronting change”), but 
even then, systemic reformation did not materialize.287  
While base communities flourished in Brazil and other Latin American countries, 
Colombia remained a relative bastion of institutional Catholicism, deeply ingrained in its 
social and political structures.288 “Hostility to autonomous popular initiatives by both 
church and government” was so strong, states Levine, that even researching the nature of 
popular organization in Colombia is difficult.289 He continues: “Control is stressed so 
heavily that innovation is choked off.”290 But innovation is not always new, as Levine 
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concludes. Innovation can surge from ancient truths that overcome modern religiosity: 
one CEB member said that the group found diocesan initiatives “difficult and boring” but 
that instead, they “search in the gospels where Jesus tells his disciples to do this and that, 
and there [they] find ideas.”291 Catholic leaders feared such independence found within 
popular structures.  
It remains dubious that CEBs in Colombia will flourish, argued Levine in 1986; 
the hierarchy uses them in name to promote pre-existent organizations under a socially 
positive label, all while constraining their potential.292 W. Philip Thornton confirmed the 
impact of such policies in his 1984 work on socialization’s role in Protestant conversions 
from Catholicism. He observed the irony that the religiousness of a Colombian who had 
been Catholic from birth actually worked against overprotective Catholic norms and 
tradition, as the faithful began to “search [for] more.”293 Furthermore, Palacios contends 
that with a political divide among Colombian priests, Protestant missions met the poor 
with greater comfort and stronger organization.294  
2. Decreasing and Questionable Adherence 
Individual adherence to traditional Catholic norms was waning. Cornelia Butler 
Flora observed in 1984 that although the dashboards of many buses and taxis still sported 
the requisite Virgin shrine, drivers were gradually transitioning to soccer team 
paraphernalia instead—for her, a sign of decreasing religiosity.295 She noted decreased 
political influence among older priests, who maintained an illusion of their authority from 
bygone days,296 and decreased desire for political influence among younger priests, who, 
being more progressive, ironically were isolated from their communities because they 
were viewed to “impede the progress of the community” by countering social vices rather 
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than simply fulfilling traditional priestly rituals.297 But in contrast to this apparent desire 
for ritualistic participation, Flora observes that 10% of Catholics in her sample never 
attend church, and 20% only attend on rare occasions.298 This lack of participation is 
evidenced in that many Colombians prove ignorant of basic Catholic knowledge. Flora 
references Benjamin E. Haddox (among others) who argues that “many Colombians 
doubtless follow the exterior rituals with little or no understanding of the rituals’ 
significance,” and that “numerous [professing] Catholics cannot identify Jesus or the 
Holy Trinity.”299 
3. Urbanization and Changing Social Norms 
Another component of Vatican II’s challenges in Colombia originated when La 
Violencia drove rapid urbanization, changing the flavor of social dynamics and exposing 
previously hopeless campesinos to new opportunities and knowledge. Thomas C. 
Bruneau and W. E. Hewitt build upon this point, exploring the ways that the Latin 
American sociocultural environment has limited the Catholic Church’s options for 
innovation in the face of changing social structures and pressures.300 While they 
specifically analyze Brazil, their arguments that Catholic decline cannot be blamed solely 
on Church policy, but must be tied to the conditions surrounding that policy, can be 
modified to the Colombian narrative. At the onset of the twentieth century’s final decade, 
Colombian democracy opened and religious freedom expanded via the new constitution. 
Where in other countries the Church had to adjust to operations in a non-authoritarian 
political environment, in Colombia, the Church faced a shift away from the elite-
controlled democratic environment of the past. Just as the political environment opened 
to competition, so did the religious.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Gene Burns’ 1992 work on Catholicism throughout Latin America makes a few 
observations about the Colombian Church at the end of the second major epoch this 
thesis considers. First, he comments that the institutional church has learned to avoid 
party-alignment, and if the Church were ever supreme in Colombian politics, it is no 
longer. As the “junior partner in the church-state alliance,” Burns suggests that the 
Colombian Church would be well served to oppose any claims of Church affiliation by 
any political group, especially subversives, to avoid losing what remains of its political 
clout. Nevertheless, he perceives that the Church likely still aims for control in politics, 
but from a distance, and with plausible deniability that comes from “following the state’s 
lead, rather than [innovating]” on the front lines of political conflict.301 Schwaller 
observes that although the Catholic hierarchy came to see Church-State enmeshment as 
detrimental to the Church’s goals,302 this perspective took only limited hold in Colombia, 
where the constitution (and national norms) retained Catholicism as the state religion 
until 1991. 
Big changes were afoot for a Catholic Church whose historic aims to shape 
society and politics could no longer be considered a unified organizational objective. La 
Violencia had illuminated the Colombian Catholic hierarchy’s power-centric ambitions, 
giving way to a divided clergy and an increasingly liberated public. While some of the 
laity and even clergy pursued revolutionary ends, the hierarchy eschewed these activities, 
lumping them together with militant Communism. Although Marxist rebel groups were a 
prominent feature in the Colombian landscape through the Cold War and beyond, the 
literature does not demonstrate significant linkages between the Church and such 
revolutionary groups. The Church did, however, endeavor to engage at the popular level 
through Catholic Action, Vatican II, and Medellín conference initiatives, but failed to 
meet the public where it was; rather, the hierarchy’s objectives and fears continued to 
shape its policies in Colombia. As such, the Church failed to inspire a fresh era of 
Catholic commitment among Colombians during this period. 
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As the urbanization that began during La Violencia continued, new social 
structures emerged that the Church was unprepared to connect with. These structures 
challenged Colombian Catholicism’s historical monopoly on moral authority and social 
control. The concept of the individual and the effects of social systems on individual 
outcomes began to emerge as issues to contend with. While in Rome and in Colombia’s 
neighbors, these issues took shape via Vatican II and its implementation, such liberal 
doctrine infiltrated the Colombian Church with difficulty. The geographically displaced 
and socially empowered populace had begun to search for answers outside Catholicism 
and the Church’s political position deteriorated. 
  
 64
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 65
V. 1990–PRESENT: CONSTITUTIONAL OPENING 
A. SUMMARY 
As political violence tempered under the Frente Nacional, fierce religious political 
alignment also tapered. “Protestants were no longer mishandled for either political or 
religious reasons,” says David Bushnell, “and the various restrictions that had been 
imposed on Protestant activities were lifted.”303 In spite of the general “spread of a 
genuine tolerance between Catholics and Protestants,”304 Catholic ethos continued to run 
deep among Colombians at large, and moves toward more liberal doctrine were not 
matched with wholesale exodus of Catholic elites from the political power structure.  
The elite-dominated political system alienated much of the populace and 
eventually led to renewed violence. To remedy these problems once and for all, a 
constitutional assembly of representatives as diverse as the country’s population 
convened to write a new constitution. The new document reflected already-growing 
trends toward secularization and pluralism. 
In spite of the new constitution’s array of measures aimed at unifying disparate 
cultural, social, and political groups under a single, equitable system, the new legalities 
found themselves at odds with deep-seated Catholic norms and traditions. 
B. PRECURSORS TO THE 1990 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY  
Under the Frente Nacional, the Church had remained an integral component of the 
Colombian system. Garcia-Guadilla and Hurtado confirm: “The [Frente Nacional] 
recognized Catholicism as the official religion, and the Roman Catholic Church as a 
fundamental element for the social order.”305 The Church’s partisan nature was 
ostensibly shifting, however. In fact, the increased executive powers and technocratic 
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tendencies of the Frente Nacional began to shift the bipolar nature of Colombian politics 
entirely.306 Dix argues that the Church “eschewed its historic partisanship and instead 
reached a de facto accommodation with the Liberals that made the Church a major prop 
of the new bipartisan National Front.”307 The National Front government fancied itself a 
protector of the Church and its roles in defining the country’s social arrangements, 
making the Church, in turn, “a supporter of the political system and of the democratic 
order regardless of which traditional party holds the presidency.”308 In essence, claims 
Dix, “the Church has served as one more support for Colombia’s elite-dominated version 
of quasi democracy and (modest) reform from above.”309  
One example of this political arrangement happened in 1985. The Church joined 
the establishment parties in condemnation of a planned labor strike.310 This action 
evidences the Church’s continued political role leading up to the 1990 constituent 
assembly, but notably, does not represent party alignment as much as alignment with the 
political status quo. Indeed, “a small, informal elite composed of business, political, 
religious, and some military leaders . . . effectively usurped power from Congress and the 
president by making the decisions—sometimes at informal meetings held in private 
homes—about what policies or laws should be implemented prior to final action by the 
legislature.”311 To that point, in 1977, President Alfonso López Michelsen stated: “Today 
we have class struggle more than party struggle. The division is between those who wish 
to end the system and those who wish to preserve it. Thus, the theme of how to make 
peace between Liberals and Conservatives is no longer topical; rather the debate is 
between friends of the ‘status quo’ and those who aspire to a different order.”312 
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Glimpses of that “different order” began to emerge as economic growth gave rise 
to political plurality even before the new constitution came to be. As Colombia’s 
economy grew through the latter quarter of the twentieth century, often at rates outpacing 
the rest of Latin America,313 traditional economic power holders found their influence 
diluted in a diverse new environment. “The economy had grown to the point where no 
one vested interest could be said to control it, and the Colombian state, though hardly 
autonomous from the wielders of economic power, was too big and too amorphous to be 
a fully reliable servant of anyone,” argues Bushnell.314 While the consociational structure 
of the Frente Nacional decreased both social and political conflict, it also resulted in 
decreased popular participation and faith in the electoral process.315  
Along with this economic diffusion came a “decline of confidence in all national 
institutions,” and “not even the Church was immune to this general phenomenon.”316 
Although the Church continued to be more trusted by the public than government 
institutions, evidence of popular doctrinal adherence was declining; priests commented 
that decreasing numbers attend personal confession, and the Church’s stance on 
contraception came to be broadly disregarded.317 Annual population growth decreased 
from about 3.2% in the 1960s to near 2% by 1980, a reflection of an urbanizing, 
industrializing society, as well as liberalizing social perspectives toward traditional 
Catholic anti-contraception doctrine.318 
Divorce followed a similar trend: re-legalized in 1976, but not for Catholic 
marriages, popular workarounds to clerical restraints on divorce proliferated rapidly.319 
By 1990, the social consensus on divorce was clear, as “the Conservative Party, once the 
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archdefender of Catholic values, nominated a divorced man who was remarried to a 
previously divorced woman.”320 
The year 1990 began in political turmoil. The bipartisan political machine 
remained thoroughly entrenched and three non-establishment presidential candidates 
were assassinated during their campaigns.321 The violence extended beyond politicians: 
“Between 1987 and 1992 there were 77 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, by far the 
highest rate in the world.”322 The list of victims was diverse, representing the government 
and legal arenas, media, guerrilla, political activism, and labor groups.323  
In 1990, then-President Barco ordered the election commission to ask each voter 
whether, “in order to strengthen participatory democracy, do you vote for the convocation 
of a constitutional assembly representative of all social, political, and regional forces of 
the Nation, democratically and popularly elected to reform Colombia’s Political 
Constitution?”324 Although many abstained, of those who voted, 88% answered yes to 
that question.325 
The 1990 constituent assembly was a response to general consensus that 
Colombia’s crime-ridden public order and security situation required renovation, and that 
the power-sharing arrangements of the Frente Nacional had blurred lines of political 
responsibility, decreasing the public’s willingness to both engage with and trust the 
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political system.326 The assembly members represented all elements of society, including 
Protestants and natives.327 
C. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ITS RESULTS 
The motivations behind, and changes in the 1991 constitution are many and 
varied. Numerous authors address this topic with specificity.328 This thesis aims only to 
note the changes most significant to religion’s relationship with the political. These 
include questions of fiscal policy, cultural and political pluralism, sovereignty, education, 
and religious freedom. 
1. Fiscal Policy 
Regarding fiscal policy, Cardenas et al. observe that prior to the new constitution, 
interest groups called gremios played heavily into the policymaking process. The 
President traditionally included various governmental and private sector figures, 
including Church representatives, in his decision-making. Post-new constitution, 
congress is more active in fiscal policy-making, and the gremios, though not absent, have 
lost the bulk of their former clout.329 Especially since the new constitution curtails the 
formerly dominant executive powers, rebalancing them with the judicial and 
legislative.330  
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2. Political Pluralism, Civil Rights, and Human Rights  
Another such area is political diversity. The new constitution was designed to 
enhance the “range of political parties,” and assure “citizens from the full spectrum of 
Colombian society […] the right to vote freely for a wider range of officials.”331 Whereas 
its 1886 predecessor declares the state’s mandate to protect “lives, honor, and 
property,”332 the 1991 constitution adds “beliefs, and rights and freedoms” to that list,333 
thus emphasizing civil liberties and human rights. These provisions opened the door to 
new parties representing diverse ideologies, theoretically diluting the weight of 
amalgamated Catholic-Conservative politics. New parties began to emerge in the shifted 
political balance, including some reflecting Protestant interests, but the two-party, elite-
dominated Liberal-Conservative system present in most early Latin American 
democracies survived longer in Colombia than elsewhere; In spite of the 1990–91 
institutional renewal project, the legacy power structure to some extent endured, at least 
in spirit.334  
Nevertheless, an array of new parties emerged in the 1990s, including Protestant 
ones, but those that did were “little more than vehicles for the political ambitions of 
leaders of charismatic mega-churches,” says Paul Freston.335 They did not represent a 
broader, unified Protestant agenda to employ its weight upon the Colombian political 
sphere.336 Freston ultimately argues that “although [Evangelical parties reflect] a 
broadening of democracy, their practices contribute little to this process.”337 Although 
Protestant leaders certainly used the 1990 constituent assembly as an opportunity to shift 
the tide away from Catholic-centric politics, this effort was focused primarily on gaining 
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civil rights equal to the Catholic Church, not ostensibly on seizing political power for its 
own sake.338 
3. Source of Sovereignty 
The constitutional assembly grappled extensively with the question of 
sovereignty. The 1886 Constitution had named God as the “Supreme Source of all 
Authority,” but the 1990 assembly was pluralistic in nature and commission; it would not 
ultimately decide to inscribe God’s sovereignty into the new constitution.339 But 
sovereignty had to reside somewhere. The remaining options were the nation or the 
people. The nation was problematic, since the nation as sovereign fails to recognize the 
political responsibility of individuals—a problem all too familiar in Colombian history. 
Colombian societal diversity made sovereignty of the people challenging—whose 
ideologies or perspectives would rule the day? Ultimately, the new constitution 
designated the people as a collective—el pueblo—as the source of sovereignty. This 
concept embodied the pluralistic nature of Colombia’s population while recognizing a 
unity imperative to a coherent political system.340 To do so, the 1991 constitution 
removed Catholicism as the official national religion, and fully legalized divorce by 
classifying all marriages under civil jurisdiction.341 Paradoxically, however, the new 
constitution held to certain Catholic mores, exemplified by its reinstatement of Bogotá’s 
traditional prefix: “Santa Fe de” (Bogotá). Furthermore, it broadly rejected appeals to 
legalize abortion.342  
4. Education 
In the latter half of the 20th century, one of the key strongholds of the Colombian 
Catholic Church was education. Dix reports that even through the 1970s, Church-
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controlled institutions accounted for 85% of preschool, 20% of primary, 50% of 
secondary, and 40% of university students in the country.343 The 1991 constitution began 
to unravel the Church’s education dominion. For example, Article 68 protects ethnic 
groups’ rights “to schooling that respects and develops their own cultural identity.”344 
The constitution as a whole protects public school students from compulsory religious 
education.345 In spite of the new constitution’s emphasis on religious equality, however, 
the Colombian government does allow the Catholic Church to operate tax-exempt 
schools in remote regions where no public schools are available; other religious groups 
complain that their schools are not given similar tax-exempt benefits.346 Furthermore, 
some complain that a Ministry of Education directive to teach public school students 
about religion led to many rural schools teaching only about Catholicism, evidence of the 
power that heritage has over legal renovations.347 
5. Freedom of Religion 
Despite these notable vestiges of Colombia’s patently Catholic heritage, religious 
liberty was a key aspect of the new constitution’s emphasis on unified pluralism. A 
battery of court decisions established various aspects of that religious liberty during the 
years following the constitution’s institution. Viviane A. Morales Hoyos cites some 
examples: 
 Decision C-088/94: Defined religious liberty as “indispensable, and that, 
under no circumstances, can it be ignored by public entities since it 
projects itself to all dimensions of relations.”348 
 Decision C-027/93: Evaluated the Concordat with the Vatican in light of 
the new constitution; determined unconstitutional various aspects of the 
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Concordat because they failed “to recognize the ideological, cultural, 
political, and religious pluralism existing in Colombia.”349 These areas 
included religious freedom, marriage, dissemination of beliefs, indigenous 
autonomy, military religious support, and education.350 
 Decision C-350/94: Rendered invalid the 1927 dedication (and 1952 
ratification thereof) of the Republic to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which 
had been politically represented through the President, exacerbating the 
Colombian political sphere’s singular religious nature.351 
 Decision C-511/94: Limited religious liberty by declaring conscientious 
objection to obligatory military service as generally not protected. The 
court essentially argued that perpetuation of a broader liberty requires 
impingement on such religiously specific liberties.352 
6. Cultural Protections At Odds With Religious Liberty 
The 1991 constitution codifies protections for both religious liberty and ethno-
cultural identity. Protecting both religion and culture, however, inherently begets conflict. 
Since these principles are not synonymous, one must ultimately supersede the other. 
Morales-Hoyos concludes that since 1991, “more protection has been given to ethnic and 
cultural diversity. Religious liberty has prevailed only when it has been in harmony with 
the cultural values of the indigenous community and has respected the integrity of social, 
political, and cultural forms.”353 Indeed, prior to the 1991 Constitution, the Catholic 
Church held special rights to administration and evangelization in areas labeled as 
mission territories. A concordat with the Vatican established these privileges in 1887, 
with some modifications in 1973.354 In a dramatic reversal, under the new constitution, 
the courts have decided repeatedly in favor of indigenous cultural value over religious 
freedoms enshrined in the 1991 document, including the right to disseminate one’s faith 
freely.  
                                                 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid., 566–7. 
351 Ibid., 567–8. 
352 Ibid., 568. 
353 Ibid., 580. 
354 Levine, Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia, 70–96; cited in Kline, Colombia, 88. 
 74
In one 1994 case, a group of 32 natives were being persecuted by their native 
community for converting to Protestant Christianity from the native religion. The group 
sought legal protections for their practice and for their pastor’s free travel in and out of 
the indigenous territory. The court, while not restricting the native converts’ freedoms to 
believe what they choose, limited their practice to outside the indigenous community, 
arguing that the rights of the indigenous community to protect its cultural and religious 
heritage trumps the right to free exercise and dissemination of other faiths within the 
group’s territory.355 In another 1994 example, natives brought a case against a Protestant 
missionary organization that had set up a permanent settlement in their territory that 
provided various social services to the native community. The plaintiffs contended that 
such a settlement undermined their community’s traditionally itinerant nature and 
damaged the ecosystem by overusing a single area.356 They further argued that methods 
the Protestants used to propagate their faith undermined the natives’ cultural 
coherence.357 The court found that the missionary organization threatened the 
“fundamental rights of the Nukak-Maku to liberty, free development of personality, 
liberty of conscience and cults, and, principally, their cultural rights.”358 The court 
bolstered its argument by citing constitutional mandates to conserve natural resources; 
the decision likened the tribe as a type of natural resource to be conserved.359 These 
examples reveal the tendencies of the courts to favor cultural value over religious value in 
the years following the new constitution’s institution. 
Diana Bocarejo’s research revealed Protestants in native communities who 
authorities accused of being affiliated with “groups outside the law.”360 Such ill-
evidenced presumptions harken to memories from La Violencia. These Protestants feared 
not only for their religious freedoms, but also for their personal security; in one case, 
                                                 
355 Morales Hoyos, “Religious Liberty,” 571–3. 
356 Ibid., 575–6. 
357 Ibid., 576–7. 
358 Ibid., 578. 
359 Ibid., 577. 
360 Bocarejo, “Reconfiguring the Political Landscape,” 199–200. 
 75
bombs destroyed a Protestant church.361 Indigenous Protestants are not only at-risk 
physically and religiously ostracized, but also politically minimized. Bocarejo quotes 
indigenous leaders, saying “evangelical Christians ‘are not important’ in the community 
because what is important is ‘what is ours, so that they have no weight even though the 
number of evangélicos has grown.’”362 She concludes that natives see Protestantism as 
rigid and exclusive; its adherents claim that they cannot be both Protestant and adhere to 
certain native traditions, while Catholicism was not as much of a problem for their tribal 
authority and unity since its adherents more readily syncretized Catholic tenets with 
native traditions.363 
Herein we find two important keys. First, evidence for our claim that many who 
asserted themselves as Catholic in the years prior to the 1970 downtrend did so not out of 
full conviction but due to socio-cultural norms or pressures. While Protestants see any 
mixing of their doctrine with native practices as hypocritical, indigenous Catholics have 
not been as rigid, argues Bocarejo.364 Second, we observe an intriguing intolerance 
among traditional indigenous groups for any members who choose to follow a different 
religious tradition to the exclusion of their previous native religious identity.365 This 
intolerance arose from natives who were beneficiaries of contrasting tolerance under the 
1991 constitution. Prior to 1991, they had been subject, as had other minority religious 
groups, to the constitutionally and concordat-mandated supremacy of the Catholic 
Church.  
The new pluralistic environment began to reveal new challenges. Not all religious 
groups were content to tolerate the others, but remarkably, the courts favored the natives’ 
intolerance, as long as it was contained to native territories. The 1991 constitution 
protects both freedom of religion and cultural pluralism. The constitutional assembly 
fortified two separate principles that are sometimes at odds with each other. The direction 
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the courts have leaned on these conflicts instructs our assessment of religion’s 
relationship with politics after the new constitution’s institution and into the future. 
Secularization seems to be a prominent thread in this unfolding narrative. But beneath the 
surface, we find that secularization may not be as pervasive as it first appears. 
D. AFTERMATH: THE LEGAL VERSUS THE REAL COUNTRY 
In time for the 1994 presidential elections—the first after the new constitution—
religious tensions mounted. Rumors surfaced that the Liberal, Ernesto Samper, if elected, 
had promised the Education Minister post to a Protestant. In response, a prominent 
Colombian Archbishop advised Liberal Catholics in a national broadcast to vote blank 
ballots rather than supporting Samper and his alleged Protestant political appointee, 
stating that voting for Samper “would damage the religious unity of the republic.”366 At 
stake were not only “religious unity,” but also Church influence. According to the New 
York Times, the most recent concordat was ruled unconstitutional in 1992 (the U.S. State 
Department in 2009 stated that the concordat persists, but that the 1991 Constitution 
rendered aspects of it unenforceable);367 regardless, the new president would be in a 
position to redefine many Church-state dynamics: the status of independent Catholic 
courts, “monopoly on religious education in public schools,” and taxation of Church 
assets.368 
But the legal framework for religious plurality under the new constitution did not 
necessarily mean institutional sentiments changed, especially within Catholicism. This is 
an instance of the Latin American legacy that Carlos Fuentes described as “a dizzying 
contradiction between law and practice […] a divorce between the real country and the 
legal country.”369 Philip Jenkins asserts more than two decades after the new constitution 
that while much of Latin America trends toward the secular, Colombia remains 
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“staunchly conservative.”370 As of 2009, the U.S. State Department maintained that “the 
Roman Catholic Church retains a de facto privileged status.”371  
This “privileged status” manifests in various ways. One example is a 1997 “law 
agreement,” accession to which is required for non-Catholic “organizations to minister to 
their adherents in public institutions” like hospitals, prisons, and schools.372 The State 
uses a series of criteria to determine approval for a group’s accession to the law, and as of 
2009, only 13 groups had been granted approval.373 Furthermore, the State only 
recognizes marriages performed by those 13 groups (with some exceptions); members of 
other groups must accomplish a civil ceremony to receive recognition.374 Regardless of a 
group’s status respecting the 1997 “law agreement,” some local-level authorities fail to 
honor the privileges given these groups by national law.375 But in spite of these cultural 
holdovers, the Catholic dominance of the past has changed in some respects. 
Some of the apparent indicators of secularization that Jenkins notes are present in 
Colombia. One such measure is birth rate. Due to traditional conservative religious views 
against contraception, he argues that low birth rates can be indicative of secularization, 
and in opposition to Jenkins’ assertion of Colombia’s conservativeness, Colombia’s birth 
rate in 2015 was lower than all of its immediate neighbors save Brazil.376 Although data 
on contraceptive use is more sporadic, a similar trend appears to hold there as well.377 
Additionally, the rate of women in the workforce is on par with the United States, 
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Germany, and the United Kingdom.378 We must distinguish, however, between measures 
of individual versus state-level secularization. 
The preceding examples indicate a trend toward secularization at the individual 
level, but Mark Chaves argues compellingly that we should not view secularization as 
“declining religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority.”379 This distinction 
makes much sense of broader secularization theory that struggles to find corroborating 
decreases in overall religious adherents. The church, it would seem, is separating from 
the political world, and even while individuals adjust their behavior, faith among 
adherents remains relatively strong, even if shifting in nature or object. 
In corroboration, Peter L. Berger also argues that “secularization on the societal 
level is not necessarily linked to secularization on the level of individual consciousness. 
Certain religious institutions have lost power and influence in many societies, but both 
old and new religious practices have nevertheless continued in the lives of individuals, 
sometimes taking new institutional forms and sometimes leading to great explosions of 
religious fervor.”380 Berger contests the “secularization theory” rooted in enlightenment 
thought and promulgated in the mid to late 20th century: that “modernization necessarily 
leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals.”381 Rather, 
claims Berger, secularization has “provoked powerful movements of counter-
secularization.”382 This implies that as secularism rose in Colombian society (and 
Catholicism), the fresh non-secular answers that Protestants offered proved attractive. 
The Pew study data on reasons for leaving Catholicism confirms such a hypothesis.383 
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1. Protestantism’s Rise: Political? 
In the wake of Colombian Catholicism’s political de-alignment and social 
engagement phase (approximately 1960–1990), the Religion’s resultant dilution opened 
“windows,” through which more liberalism entered than had been anticipated.384 
Protestantism backfilled the resultant metaphysical vacancy, but what political goals 
Protestant leaders may envision are not guaranteed to play out in the democratic field. 
Berger emphasizes two cases that illustrate this point: Chile and Colombia, where “the 
institutional interests of the denominational leaderships are by no means always a guide 
to the way believers vote. Protestants insert themselves where they can acquire a voice,” 
he contends.385 Nevertheless, Gill points out that in at least one Colombian case, 
Protestants proved instrumental in a presidential election (Ernesto Samper),386 and 
Freston observes that Chile (which joins Brazil in boasting the “oldest mass Protestantism 
in Latin America”)387 has had fewer Protestant congressmen than Colombia, home to 
“one of the [historically] weakest Protestantisms in Latin America.”388 Colombian 
secularization appears to represent a trend away from Catholicism more than a trend 
away from religion entirely. Regardless, although secularization theory proper is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, we must step back and ask, what caused the secularization that 
led to these ends? 
2. Possible Explanations for Secularization’s Emergence 
Whereas others argue for social displacement as a key factor in secularization and 
shifting demand from old toward new religious movements, Anthony Gill promotes a 
supply-side theory.389 His study of 20 Latin American countries claims that the degree of 
government regulation correlates with the level of religious diversity, implying that 
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growth of new religious movements depends on political liberalization.390 Colombia, as a 
latecomer to public religious freedom and to decreased Catholic adherents, corroborates 
this argument, but other theories bear consideration as well. 
Mainstream secularization theory is inadequate, agree Ekrem Karakoç and Birol 
Başkan, but they oppose Gill’s conclusions that the level of government regulation 
explains religiosity. Their “findings suggest that state regulation has a weak effect on 
people’s attitudes toward religion in the public sphere,” and instead argue that inequality 
offers a better gauge toward public secularization.391 The more unequal the society, the 
more likely the public is to support religious influence on politics, say Karakoç and 
Başkan.392 Colombia’s economy is indeed unequal: in 2010, 13% of Colombian society 
accounted for 85% of its capital.393 Colombia’s inequality initially rose after political 
liberalization in 1991, and after reaching a peak just over 60 in 2006, we see a year-by-
year GINI improvement with a 2013 estimate near 53, just above its 1991 starting point 
near 51.394 Despite these modest improvements, in 2012 the World Bank reported 
Colombia as “the seventh most unequal country in the world.”395 Applied alongside this 
data and what we know of religious political involvement since 1991, Karakoç and 
Başkan’s claim is underwhelming. We would expect broad public support for religion to 
leverage its weight over politics in the seventh-most unequal country in the world, but 
that expectation simply does not appear to pan out. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart 
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challenge Karakoç and Başkan,396 concluding that poverty, rather than inequality, is a 
more salient independent variable. 
Norris and Inglehart’s contrasting claim is that secularization theory was correct 
in its demand-side claims—that modernization would decrease demand for religion—but 
they propose a new supply-side hypothesis: that people continue (or return) to pursue 
religion inasmuch as they feel existentially insecure.397 In essence, the greater a person’s 
relative poverty (or security, it may follow), the more likely they are to be religious. This 
theory’s ties to the Colombian reality are also quite loose; public insecurity (measured by 
homicide rate) rose precipitously through the 1970s and 1980s,398 just the time period 
when Catholic adherents were beginning to decrease.399 However, Protestantism was on 
the rise simultaneously. It follows that Norris and Inglehart’s argument is valid, only in 
Colombia their principles manifested in Catholic adherents converting to religious 
alternatives that offered a more “personal connection with God” and “greater emphasis 
on morality.”400  
Although high fidelity statistics on religiously unaffiliated individuals is 
exceedingly difficult to find, Norris and Inglehart’s theory implies that as security has 
increased and poverty has decreased since the turn of the century,401 the rate of 
religiously unaffiliated growth in Colombia should have increased. Indeed, the 
unaffiliated population in Colombia has grown to about 6%, but Protestants have 
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simultaneously increased to 13%;402 available data does not make possible a definitive 
assessment on whether more former Catholics continue turning to Protestantism or 
instead, to nothing at all. 
One final perspective on secularization and religiosity comes from Anthony Gill 
and Erik Lundsgaarde, who argue for welfare as the key factor—that as governments 
provide more of the social aid that religious organizations once provided, people 
pragmatically fade away from religion.403 This theory takes a low view of the depth of 
adherents’ faith, regardless of which religious creed they observe. Colombia has indeed 
seen significant increases in public spending, from “1.3 percent of GDP in 1990–91 to 
almost 6 percent in 2003.”404 This trend correlates with increases in unaffiliateds, lending 
support for Gill and Lundsgaarde’s theory, although this thesis finds causality 
challenging to confirm. 
To conclude our brief discussion on secularization in modern Colombia, we are 
able to loosely conclude two main points. First, that mainstream secularization theory 
does not apply neatly to the Colombian reality; modernization, urbanization, and 
socialization of the masses has not led to wholesale exodus from organized religion. 
Second, that numerous innovative secularization theories offer a mixed bag of 
correlations, but largely fail to confirm causal factors for religious-political change in 
Colombia. The most verifiable argument is Gill’s supply-side theory—that as political 
regulation decreases (a la 1991 Colombian Constitution), religious diversity increases. 
Note that this does not necessarily imply that new diverse religious entities will enter the 
political playing field in force. 
E. CATHOLICISM’S STRUGGLE AGAINST SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
POLITICAL MODERNIZATION 
Alongside these secularization trends, Catholicism throughout Latin America has 
faced other challenges. As early as 1995, Jean Daudelin and W.E. Hewitt observed that 
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much of the academic and Catholic community’s initial optimism respecting its 
grassroots social and political programs in Latin America was unfounded: “The size, the 
effective mobilization capacity and the influence of the ‘popular’ Church appear not only 
to have been almost universally exaggerated and but also to be everywhere declining.”405 
Not only did these social engagement efforts prove underwhelming for Catholic religious 
dominance, but in the decade leading up to Daudelin and Hewitt’s analysis, even the 
Vatican seemed to be backtracking from previous political ambitions, appointing bishops 
who were less inclined toward political associations than past Church leaders.406 So it 
seemed. And perhaps was even so, from the Vatican standpoint. But Latin American 
Church leaders continued emphasizing the threatening “growth of the Pentecostals among 
the poor,” countervailing their progressive initiatives against Vatican policy out of “fear 
of being relegated to a secondary position.”407 Other Latin American church leaders 
believe attempts to engage the poor are resource saps and that renewed Catholic influence 
might be gained through engagement with elites only.408 But although the methods differ, 
the desired outcome is the same: a halt to degeneration of Catholic supremacy in the 
socio-political sphere. It seems that either way, however, the Catholic model is losing 
ground. Its attempts to maintain “social and cultural prominence” and mass followership 
remain based in an antiquated, hierarchical structure that is too cumbersome to compete 
with new organically led rivals like Pentecostals.409 Catholic exercise requires physically 
present priests, who are in low supply,410 and who are more tightly bound by the curses 
of bureaucracy than are Protestant leaders. 
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F. CATHOLICISM’S STRENGTHS 
1. Catholic Charismatics 
We must acknowledge some strengths within Colombian Catholicism that run 
alongside—or more accurately—in spite of the institution’s struggles. One example is the 
rise of Charismatic Catholic groups. These are groups that dispense with many of 
institutional Catholicism’s trappings and represent a “Catholic counterpart” to 
Pentecostalism.411 By 2000, fully 28% of Colombian Catholics considered themselves 
charismatic; but simultaneously only 3% of Colombian priests were charismatic.412 The 
lay-driven nature of this movement in Colombia has led to a Catholic charismatic 
population exceeding that of Mexico, although Mexico is home to more than double the 
number of Catholics than is Colombia.413 It also, however, creates a division between 
institutional and individual Catholicism. Some argue, however, that the Catholic 
establishment does still succeed in linking individuals with broader societal institutions. 
2. Creating Linkages That Secularism Cannot 
Organized religion, especially institutional Catholicism, in spite of its ostensibly 
negative designs on control and influence, makes beneficial connections “between people 
and the larger social structures,” says Satya R. Pattnayak; “Political parties, labor unions, 
and lobbying groups have not been quite able to comprehend the spiritual needs of the 
individual.”414 Assumptions about human motivation that emerge from advanced 
economies cannot be universally applied in areas where much of the economy is still 
developing—or as yet undeveloped entirely. Self-driven motives common to the 
developed world are less common among the poor. Here, argues Pattnayak, the Church 
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provides a necessary connection between the heart and body of the developing world 
individual and the institutional governmental and economic machine.415 But is this why 
Catholicism has remained culturally salient as it has in Colombia? 
This thesis argues that indeed, there is truth in Pattnayak’s’ assessment that 
institutional religious structures link the otherwise-disconnected poor to the broader 
social sphere, and that religious organizations provide for a personal need that secular 
ones leave unfulfilled. Nevertheless, in Colombia, Catholic cultural mores appear to 
pervade not only the disconnected countryside, but also the urban elite. Connections 
indeed materialize, but more to the Church institution itself than to any other aspect of the 
modernizing Colombian reality. This may be why progressively greater numbers of 
Catholics have sought something more spiritually fulfilling, either through Charismatic 
Catholicism or Protestantism. 
G. THE CONTINUING INSURGENT CONFLICT’S LIMITED RELEVANCE 
This thesis avoids extensive discussion of the persistent civil conflicts between 
the Colombian government and various insurgent groups. Other works evaluate these 
conflicts extensively, and despite the insurgency’s defining nature for modern Colombian 
politics and society, these conflicts are generally acknowledged as nonreligious. Jorge 
Restrepo et al. confirm: “There are no ethnic, regional or religious cleavages defining the 
conflict, allowing us to focus purely on its economic, political and military features.”416 
Indeed, the U.S. State Department reports that while accounts exist of guerrilla groups 
harassing or attacking religiously affiliated individuals and groups (including Catholics, 
Protestants, and native religions), such attacks appear not to be religiously motivated, but 
primarily economic or political in nature; Guerrillas terrorize those who oppose their 
insurgent methods and agenda.417 
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One dynamic worth noting, however, is the difference between Catholic and 
Protestant perspectives toward and relationships with insurgency. Recall the syncretistic 
ways Catholicism was tied in with violent causes during La Violencia while few, if any, 
examples exist of violence exercised under Protestant precepts. Indeed, Leslie J. 
Thompson contends that even in the modern era, “the Roman Catholic Church—although 
generally very involved in the politics of the land—has been powerless as an advocate of 
peace simply because a number of prominent Catholic leaders have favored the 
revolutionary cause.”418 Although both Catholicism and Protestantism center around a 
similar heritage, the former is somehow able to coexist with things opposed to its 
supposed fundamental doctrines.  
We can make many speculations as to why this is so in Colombia: heritage of 
conquest, colonial evangelism tainted by extractive motives, coerced native conversions, 
syncretism permitted, Catholicism’s political foundations (the Pope is the leader of a 
globally recognized state, after all). Protestants, on the other hand, answer to no political 
authority,419 and adherents tend to understand their faith less culturally and more 
spiritually. Put another way, “external symbols” and ritual play a large role in 
Catholicism, especially respecting the Virgin Mary; many of these rites do not originate 
in the Bible, therefore Protestants eschew them.420 Says Thompson: “Protestants’ 
emphases on inward rather than outward religion make the external symbols of 
Catholicism unnecessary.”421 
Thompson argues that a principal reason Catholic leadership has historically 
pursued political influence has been to control religious freedom laws and curtail 
Protestant growth.422 To revisit Hagopian, civil societies hold the key to explaining 
religious power-holders’ decisions in modern pluralistic religious environments. Where 
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the Church is strongly linked to civil society, it tends to engage on that level, whereas 
when civil society linkages are weak, the Church seeks a voice within and protection 
through political alliances.423 We have seen both extremes in Colombian Catholic 
history, but what about competing groups’ political roles in the new pluralistic 
environment? 
In the modern era, it seems the Catholic hierarchy has retreated from overt 
political aims, but nevertheless continues to see Protestantism as a threat: Pope John Paul 
II referred in 2001 to growing Protestant groups in Latin America as a “serious problem” 
requiring “resolute pastoral action.”424 Religious freedom, however, largely prevents this 
dynamic from playing out overtly in the political sphere. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The 1991 Constitution fundamentally changed the way Colombian law views 
religion and politics. This legal opening enabled manifold non-Catholic religious groups, 
most-notably Protestants, to proliferate during the 1990s. Many of these groups predated 
the new Constitution, but flourished in the new political environment. Many new political 
parties emerged as well, some of which aligned with non-Catholic religious movements. 
Although the 1991 Constitution changed the essence of Colombian law, it did not 
change wholesale the way Colombian individuals view religion. Catholicism remains 
predominant in the population even 25 years after the country’s legal renovation—
evidence of the Church’s cultural moorings—but variations to that historical pattern are 
gaining momentum. While institutional Catholicism faces the emerging competition of 
growing Protestant denominations and religion-less factions, some of its own members 
have resorted to renewing how Catholicism itself looks and acts via the Catholic 
Charismatic movement. Secularization has separated the institutional and individual 
realms of Catholicism—and religion in general—and these two spheres have emerged as 
quite distinct from each other. 
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Political participation has improved under the 1991 liberal (not referring to the 
party) mandate, but while the Catholic Church retains the (unofficial) national soul and 
Protestant groups have grown in number and tested their political sway from time to time, 
both are of late more socially than politically aligned. Nevertheless, Catholic 
undercurrents continue to run through Colombia’s veins behind the scenes. What then, 
does all of this mean for the future? Let us take a closer look at the Pew study data, and 
then proceed to develop some conclusions. 
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VI. DISSECTING PROTESTANT GROWTH 
A. SUMMARY 
To complement the foregoing history and analysis, we now more closely examine 
the data surrounding Protestantism’s advance in Colombia and juxtapose it with some 
prominent theories respecting Catholic to Protestant conversion there. Table 3 exhibits 
Protestant growth from 1905 through 2005. 
Table 3.   Total Population and Protestant Population Estimates: Colombia, 
1905–2005 
 
Adapted from: Clifton L. Holland,, “Protestant Growth in Colombia,” PROLADES, 
2000, http://www.prolades.com/cra/regions/sam/col/colombia.pdf. 
B. GENDER FACTORS 
Regarding Protestant growth in Colombia, a number of authors weigh in. Cornelia 
Butler Flora argues that Catholicism’s restrictive view on women’s roles led many to 
look elsewhere for social fulfillment.425 Some found the Protestant concept of the 
priesthood of all believers liberating for women, at least at the individual levels of church 
                                                 
425 Flora, Pentecostalism in Colombia, 187–203. 
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and home.426 This contrasted with the traditional male-dominated instruments of power 
both in the Church and in politics. 
In a parallel argument, Elizabeth Brusco claims that persistent historical efforts by 
the Catholic Church to maintain control of national politics relegated budding Protestant 
movements to local level influence. Such “schismatic” status, argues Brusco, prevented 
“male political interest” from capturing Protestantism as a medium for its own ends.427 
Free from the temptation of national political power, the Protestant movement actually 
may have found expansion easier using horizontal integration over vertical engagement.  
Numbers from the Pew study may support such a conclusion even in the present-
day environment. In Colombia, only 11% of Catholics say they share their faith at least 
once per week, less than Catholics in ten other Latin American countries. In contrast, 
fully 38% of Colombian Protestants say the same; the only Latin American countries to 
boast greater Protestant evangelization are Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Similarly, 
the disparity between Colombian Catholics and Protestants in terms of actively sharing 
their faith is greater than in all but three other Latin American countries (Peru, Brazil, and 
Venezuela).428  
David Stoll echoes Brusco’s sentiment, citing the success of small-scale groups 
such as house churches and Bible studies as evidence of “the household as the key to 
Evangelical expansion.” As proof, he cites Brusco’s research that shows the 
ineffectiveness of traditionally male-dominated, large-scale evangelistic techniques such 
as crusades for inspiring lasting conversions.429 Also citing Brusco, Virginia Garrard-
Burnett continues her logic: as machismo is diminished among Protestant men, their 
husband-wife power relations become more balanced and the family as a whole is 
                                                 
426 Ibid., 202–203. 
427 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 143. 
428 “Religion in Latin America,” 6. 
429 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 318. 
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strengthened. At that level, Protestantism’s community-based local responsiveness gives 
it a strength not found in the rigidity of traditional Catholic structure.430  
C. A NORTH AMERICAN-DRIVEN MOVEMENT? 
Brusco and Stoll stand against a vein of scholarship claiming the power of North 
American influence in Protestantism’s Latin American rise. They argue that “blaming 
evangelical growth on the United States suggests a deep distrust of the poor, an 
unwillingness to accept the possibility that they could turn an imported religion to their 
own purposes.”431 One example that points toward this hypothesis is the distinction 
between Protestant prayer styles in the United States and Colombia. The Colombian style 
is more boisterous and participatory, and remains relatively constant across Colombian 
Protestantism’s various denominations.432 
D. PENTECOSTALISM: A MOVEMENT VERSUS AN INSTITUTION 
Pentecostalism, a Protestant denomination, is doctrinally unique to the main body 
of Protestants and is especially significant to the study of modern religion in Colombia 
because of its high market share. William K. Kay noted in 2009—and the 2014 Pew 
study corroborates—that Pentecostals comprise approximately 50% of Colombian 
Protestants.433 In 1976, Cornelia Butler Flora noted certain distinctions between 
Colombian Catholics’ experience and the methods of Pentecostals: “when [Pentecostal] 
believers got together, they read their Bibles and discussed doctrine, allowing the group 
rather than an individual to be guardian of the teachings,” also, she cited Pentecostal 
Pioneer William Drost as an example of how Pentecostals treated the Colombians as 
“brethren” rather than as subservient proselytes, granting leadership roles to locals and 
avoiding power politics.434  
                                                 
430 Brusco, “Asceticism and Masculinity.” Cited in Garrard-Burnett, “Conclusion: Is This Latin 
America’s Reformation?,” 205. 
431 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, xvi. Cited in Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 4. 
432 Brusco, Evangelical Conversion, 169. 
433 Kay, Pentecostalism, 125. This information is no longer accessible at the Internet source Kay cites. 
Kay’s data is corroborated by: “Religion in Latin America,” 62. 
434 Flora, Pentecostalism in Colombia, 39. 
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Flora’s research ultimately centers on the role of lower-class solidarity 
movements. Colombian political polarization was dissimilar to other Latin American 
cases in that it was based regionally on the leanings of caudillos435 rather than existing 
solely in an urban versus rural dichotomy.436 This means that under conditions of 
extensive social dislocation, “new institutions, which have generally been imposed from 
the top, only partially absorb the new societal pressures.”437 Form and function matter; 
horizontally oriented designs produce movements rather than constrained rigid systems. 
The ideology inherent in solidarity movements, concludes Flora, is not the 
primary catalyst of social change. Contrary to prominent scholarship that ties 
Protestantism to structural shifts toward capitalism,438 she found that at the individual 
level, Pentecostals and Catholics did not differ in their societal impacts. Rather, “the 
existence of the movement, rather than the individual adherents . . . is the meaningful unit 
of social change.” She argued that “the major impact of lower-class solidarity movements 
comes about as other systems react to them,” and by that means, “it is possible for class-
based religious movements to progress to fulfill more overt instrumental functions.”439 In 
sum, Flora claims that the impact of the Pentecostal movement was not in its ideological 
difference from Catholicism, but in its cooperative movement architecture. This thesis 
contends, however, that such architecture is in many respects a derivative of differing 
doctrine, especially that governing ecclesiastical authority. 
E. REPRESSION’S ROLE 
Flora further contradicts common views, stating that repression is not the root 
cause of religious and economic solidarity movement formation. She contends that while 
repression does bring about political opposition, it is a combination of high social 
                                                 
435 Caudillos are strongmen who exert political and social authority, typically within defined territorial 
areas, usually through a fearsome reputation and repressive tactics. 
436 Flora, Pentecostalism in Colombia, 78. 
437 Ibid., 76. 
438 Flora references Weber (1958), Lenski (1963), and Eisenstadt (1968) as proponents of such a 
perspective. Ibid., 230. 
439 Ibid. 
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dislocation and low external control that most-supported Pentecostal movement 
growth.440 Of course, violence and repression is what drove most of that dislocation, so 
social dislocation may be better viewed as an intervening variable than an independent 
variable.  
The Pew study data gives clues regarding Flora’s perspective on social 
dislocation. Present-day Catholics were only 4% less likely than Protestants to “have 
relocated at some point in their lives.”441 While the study data does not offer insight into 
social dislocation’s impact on religious switching in the era of rapid urbanization during 
and following La Violencia, it does reveal a surprisingly weak correlation between 
dislocation and switching from Catholicism to Protestantism. 
F. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OR INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION… OR 
BOTH? 
Anthony Gill counters the view that when individuals become geographically and 
culturally displaced, they become “more susceptible to the appeals of new religious 
movements.”442 He instead argues that the degree of government regulation on religious 
communities determines the degree and diversity of religious “supply” and lower 
regulation incentivizes its consumption.443 He rates Colombia lowest in the region in 
religious pluralism growth between 1970–1980, which may explain why Protestant 
growth has been slower to take hold in Colombia than in countries like Brazil (Gill’s 
highest pluralism score), but his theory on its own evidently leaves some of the story 
untold. Some countries with relatively low government regulation scores also saw 
relatively low increases in pluralism, and vice-versa (Ecuador and Argentina, for 
example).444 The Pew study offers some fidelity. 
We juxtapose Gill’s analysis with Pew’s conclusions on top reasons Colombians 
who have converted to Protestantism “stopped being Catholic.” When asked which of 
                                                 
440 Ibid., 232–3. 
441 “Religion in Latin America,” 36. 
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eight options were important reasons they left Catholicism, the overwhelmingly most 
common reason cited—by 87% of respondents—was “wanted personal connection with 
God,” followed by “enjoyed worship style at new church,” “wanted greater emphasis on 
morality,” “found church that helps members more,” and “outreach by church member,” 
all cited by more than 50% of respondents. The less-important options (all cited by fewer 
than 20% of respondents) were “personal problems,” “wanted better financial future,” 
and “married non-Catholic.”445 Unfortunately, the Pew study did not reveal how the 
weight of heritage and institutional pressure affected conversions. We can conclude from 
Gill’s analysis that low government regulation may be one causal factor to increased 
religious pluralism, but at the personal level, Catholics-turned-Protestant were seeking to 
fill an empty metaphysical space that they felt as Catholics. 
Respecting personal motives for conversion, the Pew study contradicts any 
attempt to link Protestant conversion to the so-called “prosperity gospel,” that is, “God 
will grant wealth and good health to believers who have enough faith.” Not only are 
converts who say they switched in pursuit of improved finances conspicuously minimal, 
but also the numbers of Colombian Catholics and Protestants who believe such a doctrine 
are high and similar (80%–82%).446  
G. OTHER CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT DISTINCTIONS 
Another revelation from the Pew study respects the priorities of Protestants versus 
Catholics. In Latin America as a whole, the study found that Catholics favored “charity 
work for the poor” (50%) over “[bringing] the poor and needy to Christ” (24%) as the 
“most important way Christians can help the poor.” Protestants contrasted, favoring 
bringing the poor to Christ over charity work on their behalf, 47% to 37%.447 However, 
saying and doing are different matters. The Pew study discovered that in all countries but 
El Salvador, Protestants were more likely to actually engage in work to assist the needy. 
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In Colombia, the difference was 18%: 43% of Catholics said that they had participated in 
charity work in the last year, compared to 61% of Protestants.448  
H. THE STATISTICAL BOTTOM LINE 
According to the Pew study, by 2014, Colombia’s Catholic adherents had 
decreased 16% from a 1970 peak: 95% to 79%. Nevertheless, the decrease in Colombia 
lags behind the majority of Latin America. Only three countries in the region remain as or 
more Catholic than Colombia by percentage—Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay—and only 
five have seen an equal or lesser percentage decrease in Catholicism between 1970 and 
2014: Bolivia and Chile (-12%), Ecuador (-16%), Mexico (-15%), and Paraguay (-
5%).449 Colombia remains culturally Catholic, socially divergent, and legally neutral. 
  
                                                 
448 Ibid., 22. 
449 Ibid., 27. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters evaluate numerous events, entities, and conditions that 
contribute to Colombia’s religious-political environment. As has been shown, these 
dynamics shifted drastically across the 85-year timespan evaluated here, all while 
maintaining a certain foundational constancy centered on Catholicism. Some conclusions 
from this analysis are apparent, but a comprehensive conclusion on religion’s role in 
Colombian politics in the decades to come will require additional work.  
This thesis’ major contribution is synthesis of the major religious-political themes 
in modern Colombian history, and as many related nuances as scope permits, where such 
an endeavor has not been accomplished elsewhere. Aiming to integrate sufficiently 
detailed historical accounts and statistics with diverse published academic theories, this 
thesis has laid the groundwork for more detailed prognostic studies on the future of the 
Colombian political system as it relates to a changing, yet in some respects incongruously 
stationary religious environment. Nevertheless, we can make some deductions based on 
the preceding narrative and analysis. 
A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF THE PERIODS EVALUATED 
Prior to La Violencia, the Colombian Catholic Church as an organization was part 
and parcel of Conservative politics. Simultaneously, its rituals and tenets formed into 
prevalent cultural patterns that to some extent persist today. This cultural aspect of 
Colombian Catholicism exhibits two defining traits: it was not confined by political 
affiliation, and it was highly syncretistic. 
As La Violencia crescendoed, the dominant political alignment of Catholic 
leaders was Conservative. This alignment turned the political conflict into a sometimes-
religious one as well. This thesis presented much evidence of Catholic leaders and 
adherents’ participation in the era’s atrocities. The continuing conflict spread across the 
then-highly rural country, shifting in nature from principally political to principally 
social. Concurrently, Church leaders, while remaining mainly Conservative-aligned, 
began distancing themselves from and speaking against the violence. In spite of 
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these humanitarian shifts, much of the damage had already been done.  
Vallier offers an apt synopsis of what effects La Violencia and its antecedent 
Catholic-Conservative alliance had on the Church in Colombia (this quotation is cited in 
its entirety in Chapter II):  
If a religious system, as represented by its spokesmen and elites, becomes 
identified with a particular political group and finds that its survival is 
bound up with the survival of that group, it loses an autonomous position 
of leverage to build and create a generalized system of meanings. . . . If 
this happens, the distinction between the political and religious spheres 
collapses. Competition and social conflict emerge as naked struggles of 
force and power, rather than as processes of give and take that can be 
muted and sustained by a set of common beliefs of a more general 
nature.450 
A number of pivotal observations are present in this quote: Adherents did not 
define the Catholic religious system; elites did. In spite of cultural adherence regardless 
of political affiliation, the coupling of Catholic elites with Conservative politics drove the 
corporate Church’s generally Conservative character. Therefore, during La Violencia, the 
Church was in no position to promote a common set of meanings that could have 
tempered the conflict. Rather, Catholicism’s political nature fueled the carnage (see 
Chapter III for examples). 
Indeed, as Vallier posits, Catholicism’s position of power had grown dependent 
on Conservative dominance. As La Violencia ended and the Frente Nacional government 
formed, the Church, already of questionable moral authority and diminished political 
clout, needed a new strategy if it were to continue leading the Colombian religious field. 
During this time, the Church realigned as a (officially) non-partisan member of the elite. 
This attempt led to increased social engagement and efforts to impose Catholic authority 
over nongovernmental areas of power like labor and social welfare. But not all Catholic 
leaders ascribed to this progressive agenda; those who did were confronted with leftist 
radicals on one side and conservative stalwarts on the other. Levine concludes that this 
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division precluded the Church from unifying its cause, regaining legitimacy, and 
connecting with a growing population that was moving in new directions.451 
As increasing social mobilization faced the National Front’s exclusive elite-
controlled democracy and related violence increased in the late 1980s, Colombia sensed 
its need for an inclusive political system if it were to maintain political peace. The 
resultant new constitution opened the door for an emerging spectrum of political parties, 
and also de-instated the Church from its long-held position as the official national 
religion. But while Catholicism lost its legal hold on social status and political power in 
Colombia, it retained an unofficial elite position with respect to the law (see Chapter V) 
and a continuing ritual effect among the populace. 
We can broadly summarize the Church’s nature during these three periods as 
follows: 
 1930–1960: Conservative political, powerful. 
 1960–1990: Nonpartisan political with divergent factions, weakening. 
 1990–present: Officially apolitical, culturally persistent, statistically 
declining. 
B. HYPOTHESES ASSESSED 
This thesis makes numerous observations throughout that cannot all be reviewed 
in detail here. Nevertheless, a brief review of the two principal questions and series of 
possible answers presented in Chapter I is warranted. The first question (what has driven 
the decrease in Colombian Catholic adherents since 1970?) stimulates three principal 
hypotheses: 
 Colombia was never 90+% Catholic, but appeared to be as many who 
professed the faith did so out of compulsion or socio-political pressure. 
The statistical decline began as Catholicism’s power in social and political 
spheres lessened and individuals became more willing to express dissent 
as threats to life and property diminished.  
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 100
 Time and experience revealed a dark side of Catholicism that when 
exposed, began to drive adherents away and toward alternatives: many to 
Protestantism, others to renounce religion entirely. 
 External influences such as foreign missionaries, international political 
actors (principally the United States), and Vatican hierarchy, drove this 
shift. 
Based on evidence and analysis exhibited throughout this thesis, the first two 
hypotheses are most compelling. While certainly contributory, the third hypothesis 
suffers from limited evidence and questionable causality. 
The second question this thesis asks (how will these religious changes affect 
Colombian politics in the future?) generates two main possibilities: 
 As the diverse and largely apolitical Protestant movement encourages 
greater personal political freedom, believers are no longer compelled to 
side with a specific church or party affiliation. Peaceful political discourse 
increases since political affiliation is (at least theoretically) no longer tied 
to elite power structures, religious or political. 
 Catholic believers have remained basically unchanged in demographic 
proportion. Changes in adherents observed in the Pew study are due to 
earlier social and political pressures that drove many to superficially 
identify with Catholicism. The Colombian Catholic Church remains 
essentially where it was a little over one century ago (minus 
constitutionally mandated supremacy) and will continue to exhibit a mixed 
bag of reactive religious political plays that reflect its currently perceived 
threats. 
Both of these hypotheses are compelling, based on the evidence and analysis 
presented herein. This thesis contends that at the personal level, political positions will 
continue to diverge from and remain largely separate from religious affiliation. Political 
engagement by religious groups will be primarily issue-based rather than power-based. 
At the organizational level, however, Catholic leadership will be divided between humble 
benevolence and continuing attempts to engage as a political elite, even as Colombia’s 
strongly consolidating democracy progressively diminishes the significance of eliteness. 
These conclusions cohere with Chaves’ contention that secularization comprises more “a 
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declining scope of religious authority” than a decline in personal religious 
engagement.452 
Secularism threatens to overrun much of Colombia’s historical religiosity in the 
coming decades, and indeed already has. Nevertheless, as Berger argues, “religious 
institutions have lost power and influence in many societies, but both old and new 
religious practices have nevertheless continued in the lives of individuals, sometimes 
taking new institutional forms and sometimes leading to great explosions of religious 
fervor.”453 In some respects, this principle can be seen at work in statistical shifts from 
Catholicism to Protestantism in Colombia. This conversion in religious adherence 
weakens overall Catholic political clout and generally does not translate into new 
Protestant political aims. 
C. FINAL COMMENTS 
While this thesis has reached some conclusions regarding past and future 
Colombian religious-political dynamics, its primary contribution is its synthesis of 
history and literature covering a long period of time, revealing patterns of religious-
political interaction in Colombia. Further research could springboard off of the trends 
evaluated here to make more detailed predictions regarding future religious influence in 
Colombian politics, and could apply that understanding to anticipate the significance of 
religious groups for future political outcomes such as negotiations with insurgent groups 
or implementation of controversial social initiatives. 
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